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Abstract
This paper demonstrates the effects of ethnic diversity on social relationships and the quality
of public spaces at a very finite neighborhood level. We use detailed block level data on diversity
and housing quality from a representative survey on housing in France. We show how and to
what extent diversity within a neighborhood can directly affect household well-being and the
quality of the common spaces, whereas the previous literature looks at more aggregate outcomes
through voting channels. Our identification strategy relies on the exogeneity of public housing
allocations with respect to ethnic characteristics in France, to address the bias due to endogenous
residential sorting. Diversity is shown to have a negative effect on the quality of local public
goods, either due to vandalism, not deterred by other-regarding preferences and social policing,
or due to collective action failure to ensure effective property management. However, we find that
diversity has no robust effect on public safety at a local level and, if anything, is more related to
social anomie. Addressing exogeneity concerns, we examine residential allocation across public
housing blocks with respect to ethnic characteristics. We also show that our results are not
driven by potential biases from self-reported well-being and that they also hold with objective
measures of housing quality.
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1 Introduction
Recent research has drawn an ominous picture of the implications of cultural heterogeneity on social
peace and economic growth. A large literature shows a negative relationship, though not always
robust, between ethnic diversity and the quality of public goods (Alesina et al., 1999; Alesina and La
Ferrara, 2000; Miguel, 2004; Miguel and Gugerty, 2005), welfare spending (Luttmer, 2001), civil con-
flict and trust (Fearon and Laitin, 2000; Putnam, 2007; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002) and economic
growth (Alesina, Baqir and Easterly, 1999). The leading explanations of why ethnic fragmenta-
tion affects those outcomes are the heterogeneity of preferences and the free-rider problem which
undermines collective action. The literature thus views the problem of fractionalization in terms
of voting behavior on aggregate outcomes such as public good provision at the country or county
level. Yet, little is known on how diversity could affect directly social relationships and well-being
at the neighborhood level. Our paper fills this gap by looking at the effect of ethnic diversity on
social relations and the quality of common spaces within local communities at the housing block
level. Besides we provide a new identification strategy to overcome the endogeneity problem raised
by residential self-selection. We rely on a natural experiment of exogenous spatial allocation in the
French public housing sector to identify the causal effect of diversity on those outcomes.
The main contribution of our paper is to identify the effect of ethnic diversity on social rela-
tionships and the quality of public goods at a very local block level. We use micro data on housing
conditions where the units of observation are public housing blocks made up of twenty adjacent
households on average. This is a key improvement for the analysis of how diversity shapes social
relationships compared to the previous literature which is based on aggregated data at the county,
regional or country levels. Diversity might matter for various reasons at different levels and the
channels through which diversity operates are likely to depend on the size of the unit of observa-
tion. By focusing on the provision of public goods at an aggregate level, the previous literature is
mainly interested in the effect of diversity on collective action through lobbying or patronage (see
Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) for a survey). Instead, we analyze in this paper how diversity within
a small community affects individual well-being and satisfaction with housing conditions through
relationships among neighbors. Indeed, the survey we use (French Housing Survey) reports specific
information about the neglect and voluntary degradations of the public areas, the quality of the
housing, and direct interpersonal conflicts. These data enable us to identify various effects of di-
versity on local social relationships and public good outcomes, and to explore the possible channels
explaining this link.
When residents of more diverse blocks report that neglect and voluntary degradation is rife in
their housing unit, we interpret this as a result of the residents’ failure to develop social norms
and other regarding preferences. When they report the breakdown and the poor quality of basic
facilities (such as heating and soundproofing), we interpret this as a result of a diminished capacity
for collective action for social improvement. Those goods are of course not directly degraded by
diversity. But diversity might be associated with lower ability for collective action, explaining the
irregularity of maintenance and the absence of repairs in more diverse blocks. In this case, the result
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could be supported in equilibrium if the housing directorate reckons that it can neglect facilities in
ethnically heterogeneous housing projects, knowing that it will not face collective action from its
residents demanding better services. Finally, when residents report incidents of direct interpersonal
conflicts, we can interpret this as an effect of diversity on cultural enmity. We test these channels
by using indirect objective measures of the quality of social relationships and common spaces, such
as the number of repairs and the upkeep of the security equipment. We find that diversity decreases
the quality of local common spaces, but has no effect on public safety. Instead, individuals are more
likely to report the absence of any social relationship with their neighbors rather than interpersonal
conflicts. Thus diversity leads to social anomie, preventing the emergence of social norms and col-
lective action, rather than antipathy at the local neighborhood level.
In order to make unbiased causal inferences, we provide a new strategy for identifying the causal
effect of diversity on economic and social outcomes. The general concern in this literature is that
the endogenous residential sorting of individuals on ethnic grounds biases the estimate of the impact
of diversity. We address this issue by using a natural experiment in which households in France are
allocated to public housing blocks without taking their ethnic origin or their preference for diversity
into account. Due to a strongly republican ideology, the French public housing system allocates
state planned moderate cost rental apartments (HLMs - Habitations à Loyer Modéré) to natives
and immigrants without concern for their cultural and ethnic background, mixing people indiscrim-
inately. Some HLM neighborhoods are consequently quite diverse, and others quite homogeneous.
Furthermore, HLM inhabitants rarely move, as the rents are much lower than market rates, and
moving between HLM blocks is quite difficult. Consequently, residents cannot choose whether to
live near people like themselves. Rather, they accept their placement, whether next to co-ethnics or
strangers. Methodologically, this means that we can take the degree of diversity in any one HLM
block as exogenous, connect the level of diversity with the housing situation, and examine whether
greater heterogeneity leads to poorer provision of public goods or more troubled social relationships
in French communities. We extensively document the actual process of allocation of households
within the public housing sector. We show that legal rules prohibit housing allocation based on
ethnic backgrounds and that in practice, the characteristics of the public housing sector make it
very complicated to bypass the law. Then, we conduct a variety of formal statistical tests to verify
the absence of self-sorting on ethnic characteristics. In particular, we show that the observed spatial
distribution of residents across public housing blocks is not statistically different from a random dis-
tribution generated by Monte Carlo simulations. We perform a variety of alternative tests. We show
that while households moving into a new neighborhood tend to self-segregate in the unconstrained
private housing market, there is no such evidence in the public housing market. We also examine
potential self-selection prior to the move and show that households that have refused an offer end
up living in public housing blocks that display the same ethnic diversity as those who accepted their
first offer. Thus even if households try to be choosy with respect to the ethnic composition of their
neighborhoods, they cannot self-segregate in the public housing sector due to the allocation process
and the tight supply constraints of dwellings.
Naturally, this paper is not the first one to try to overcome this identification issue. But pre-
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vious attempts to establish causality rely mainly on instrumental variables.1 However convincing
the instruments might be, this strategy cannot overcome the concern as to whether the instruments
fulfill the exclusion restriction and do not have a direct effect on public goods. For instance, Miguel
(2004) and Miguel and Gugerty (2005) use the pre-colonial patterns of settlement as instruments,
assuming that these variables have no direct impact on present-day ethnic relations. More recently
Glennerster et al. (2010) have also relied on historical data of fractionalization as an instrument.
But since past settlement patterns are likely to have at least some direct impact on present-day
ethnic relations, the exclusion restriction might still be technically violated. Using a natural ex-
periment with exogenous allocation of ethnic groups is thus an alternative strategy to deal with
these traditional caveats. The paper which is the closest to ours is Dahlberg et al. (2011), which
uses a nation-wide policy intervention program that exogenously placed refugees coming to Sweden
across the Swedish municipalities. However, their paper examines in-group bias in preferences for
redistribution rather than the effect of diversity on local public goods and social relationships.
Our paper is related to the large literature on the effects of ethnic diversity on economic and so-
cial outcomes. In US cities, higher ethnic diversity has been found to be associated with lower social
capital (Putnam, 2007; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000 and 2002), lower welfare spending (Luttmer,
2001), and poorer quality of public goods (Alesina et al., 1999). In Western Kenya, the greater the
mixing of tribes, the less people have public spiritedness, and the lower the contributions to public
goods (Miguel, 2004; Miguel and Gugerty, 2005). In cross-national surveys, diversity correlates with
low growth in GDP and low quality of institutions (Easterly and Levine, 1997; Alesina et al., 2003).
Alesina and Zhuravskaya (2011) show that islands of homogeneity amid a broadly diverse country do
not decrease the negative effects of diversity on the quality of government. Theoretical contribution,
in particular on ethnic conflicts, can be found in Caselli and Coleman (2012) and Esteban and Ray
(2011).2 These findings are depressing, in a normative sense, for those who herald gains from diver-
sity (Page, 2007); and depressing, in an empirical sense, as in our globalized world, local cultural
diversity is increasingly common (Dancygier, 2010). However, the robustness of the relationship
and the channels at work remain to be determined. Putnam (2007) is careful to underline that his
data allow him only to claim short run correlation between diversity and trust. Miguel (2004) finds
no diversity impacts on local outcomes in Tanzania, a country in which the ruling authorities have
sought to ameliorate ethnic cleavages by promoting a common language. Posner (2004) shows that
changed electoral rules can create broader ethnic identities thereby reducing fragmentation. Dun-
1In their seminal contribution to the literature, Alesina et al. (1999) provide a first attempt to deal with this
endogeneity issue by collecting data at different levels of aggregation (cities, metropolitan areas and counties). Their
assumption is that different levels of aggregation allow for the correction of the potential biases introduced by Tiebout
sorting.
2The magnitude of the relationship between those outcomes and ethnic diversity is substantial. Putnam (2007)
finds that the difference between living in a highly homogeneous city (Bismarck, North Dakota) and the heterogeneous
Los Angeles is as great as the difference between an area with a poverty rate of 7 percent and one with a poverty rate of
23 percent. Alesina et al. (1999) show that moving from complete homogeneity to complete heterogeneity is associated
with a reduction in spending on roads by nine percentage points. Luttmer (2001) finds that interpersonal preferences
based on negative exposure and racial group loyalty of recipients are associated with 33 percent of the cross-state
variation in the support for welfare spending. Alesina et al. (2003) show that moving from perfect homogeneity to
maximum heterogeneity would be associated with a reduction in a country’s growth rate by two percentage points
per year.
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ning and Harrison (2010) show that inter-tribal polarization in Mali is reduced with cross-cutting
cleavages. Glennerster, Miguel and Rothenberg (2010) also argue that the presence of strong chiefs
at the local level, although reinforcing the salience of ethnicity, translates into effective inter-ethnic
cooperation. Finally, Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) document the potential positive effect of diver-
sity on productivity through complementarity in skills.
Our paper is also incidentally related to empirical works examining neighborhood effects on so-
cial and economic outcomes. So far, the literature has mainly focused on the neighborhood effects
on physical and mental health, economic self-sufficiency, risky and criminal behavior, or educational
outcomes (see among many others Katz et al., 2001; Oreopoulos, 2003; Goux and Maurin, 2007 and
Kling et al., 2007). In particular, Katz et al. (2001) and subsequent contributions use the Moving to
Opportunity social experiment to estimate the externalities from neighbors. To avoid the problem of
endogenous neighborhood selection, those authors use data from a randomized experiment in which
some families living in high-poverty U.S. housing projects were offered housing vouchers to enable
them to move to higher income areas. While our paper is not based on a randomized experiment,
we also avoid the inferential issues of residential endogenous selection by using the exogenous spatial
allocation of households with respect to ethnic characteristics. We enlarge the dimensions analyzed
in this literature by looking at how immediate neighborhood diversity affects well-being and the
quality of the local environment.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data. Section 3
documents our identifying assumption on the absence of residential self-sorting in public housing.
We conduct various tests to show that the spatial allocation of households across public housing
blocks within localities is exogenous with respect to ethnic characteristics. Section 4 shows our
main results. We document the effects of ethnic diversity on satisfaction with housing condition,
local public goods quality and social relationships. We discuss the various dimensions and channels
through which diversity might matter for households’ well-being at the finite local level. Section 5
provides tests of the validity of self-reported outcomes, and we perform a series of robustness checks
on our results in section 6. Section 7 documents additional tests on the exogeneity of the residential
allocation in the public housing sector. Section 8 concludes.
2 Presentation of the data
2.1 Data sets
The analysis is based on two representative French national surveys. We use the French Labor
Force Survey (Enquête Emploi, INSEE, hereafter the LFS) to test our identification assumption
that spatial allocation in the public housing market can be considered as quasi-random and exoge-
nous relative to ethnic characteristics. The survey covers the period 2003-2007 and provides all the
relevant information about ethnic background, economic characteristics and geographic location of
individuals to test our identification strategy. The sampling unit of this database is at the housing
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block level, which consists in twenty adjacent households on average.3 Over the 2003 to 2007 period,
more than 10,000 different housing blocks were sampled. All the households within a randomly
selected housing block were surveyed and, within each household, all persons aged fifteen or over
were interviewed. Using these data, we can work on real neighborhoods at a very small geographic
level. Moreover, we have information on whether the respondent was living in a public housing unit,
whether he or she has been living in his or her current public housing for at least one year or whether
he or she has just moved into the neighborhood. These particular features enable us to compute the
level of ethnic diversity prevailing within each public housing block and to test for the absence of
self-sorting on ethnic background across public housing blocks.
We use the French Housing Survey 2002 (Enquête Logement, INSEE, hereafter the HS), to
estimate the relationship between ethnic diversity and the quality of public space within the housing
block. We identify the causal effect of diversity and control for self-sorting by focusing on the
public housing sector. The HS provides detailed information on the intensity and quality of social
interactions within housing block, including social relationships and the quality of local public spaces,
ranging from vandalism in the common areas, to housing quality and conflicts in the neighborhood.
The HS also reports detailed information about the ethnic, economic and social backgrounds of
individuals within the neighborhood.4 In the HS, all the individuals living in a given housing block
are not systematically surveyed and are randomly drawn instead. We thus cannot compute ethnic
fractionalization on a representative sample at the housing block from the HS. We overcome this
concern by using the 1999 French Population Census. Each HS sample is drawn from the most
recent Census and the geographical units of the HS are a subsample of those of the Census. As
the Census provides variables such as birth country or nationality at birth, it allows us to compute
representative fractionalization indices at the housing block level and then to match them with the
corresponding housing block in the HS. Table 18 in Appendix A presents descriptive statistics for
the housing blocks in the Census and the Housing Survey.
2.2 Fractionalization indexes
We use the standard ethno-linguistic fractionalization (hereafter ELF) index used in the literature
(e.g. Alesina et La Ferrara for a survey, 2005) to construct our measure of ethnic diversity. 5 This
index reflects the probability that two randomly drawn individuals from a given population belong
to different groups (previous studies looked at ethno-linguistic or religious groups). More formally,
the basic fractionalization index is computed as one minus the Herfindahl index of ethno-linguistic
group shares:
ELF j =
i=N∑
i=1
sij (1− sij) = 1−
i=N∑
i=1
s2ij (1)
3INSEE has chosen this sampling strategy so as to reduce the traveling expenses of those who administer the
survey.
4Some of the key variables for our study are not public. The French Statistical Institute (INSEE) made their access
possible as part of a convention between the INSEE and Sciences Po. We were required to make use of the "sensitive"
data within the confines of the INSEE.
5We have also tried alternative indexes such as polarization indicators, yielding similar results.
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where sij is the share of group i (i=1, ..., N) in area j. If the population living in area j is fully
homogeneous, ELF j equals 0 and it converges to 1 as the population heterogeneity increases. Note
that ELF j can increase for two reasons: it will increase with the number of ethno-linguistic groups,
and it will increase the more equal the size of the groups. As mentioned above, the Census data and
the LFS provide information about the country of birth and the nationality at birth of individuals,
allowing us to construct two different measures of diversity. In the remainder of the paper, we focus
on diversity as measured by nationality at birth, computed at the block level. The distribution of
diversity in housing blocks is presented in Appendix A (Figure 1 and Table 19).6 Unsurprisingly,
given that immigrants and second generation French are more likely to be eligible for public housing
dwellings on income criteria than native French, the public housing neighborhoods are characterized
by higher levels of diversity than other neighborhoods.
2.3 Sample characteristics
We now document the characteristics of the 2002 Housing Survey. Most of the variables are given at
the household level. The dataset contains 32,156 households, corresponding to 78,791 individuals.
39.6 percent of the French households are renters while 56 percent are owners. Overall, 15.77 percent
of the households live in public housing units, representing 39.8 percent of the tenants.
Table 1 shows the main socio-demographic characteristics of the sample. We compare house-
holds living in the public and in the private housing sectors. Foreigners (or immigrants) are over-
represented in the public housing population compared to the private housing population. Public
housing neighborhoods are also characterized by a poorer socio-economic environment: the unem-
ployment rate is around twice as high as in private housing blocks. Individuals living in public
housing dwellings are less educated and earn lower incomes. Around one third of the adults have no
diploma at all, and the share of individuals having achieved graduate studies is less than half the
corresponding share in the private housing sector. Column 3 shows that the two populations are
statistically significantly different with respect to most of their characteristics. Column 4 shows the
characteristics in the private housing sector when we restrict to tenants. Still, the two populations
are statistically significantly different (Column 5).
Table 2 documents the perception of housing conditions by native French and immigrants in
the public housing sector. On average, natives have a much better opinion about the quality of
their housing than Maghrebians or other Africans.7 Table 2 shows that 13.8 percent of the native
French are very satisfied with their housing conditions while this is the case for only 8.42 percent
of the Maghrebians. Conversely, only 9.9 percent of the native French complain about insufficient
housing conditions versus 18.21 percent of the Maghrebians. The last line of Table 2 reveals that
the poorer housing conditions are associated with lower levels of income, a situation more salient
6On the public housing graph, we see that 6 percent of public housing blocks are perfectly homogeneous. This
high frequency is to a large extent explained by the fact that in many blocks we observe only very few inhabitants,
thereby increasing the chance of getting a null ELF. We keep those blocks in our main analysis, but we checked that
deleting them does not affect the results.
7We observe the same pattern when we look at the various subjective and objective measures of the quality of
public housing
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for Maghrebian and African families. In particular, the households that are very satisfied with their
housing conditions earn on average 13,300 Euros per year, while very unsatisfied households earn
10,127 Euros a year on average. From the last column, we observe that the average Maghrebian
family earns even less than that (8,603 Euros).
3 The exogeneity of diversity in the public housing sector
This section addresses the main identification issue raised by the estimation of the effect of ethnic di-
versity on social interactions and the quality of public goods. The issue, common to all the literature
on ethnic diversity, is that fractionalization presents a high risk of endogeneity. Individuals generally
tend to self segregate: they prefer forming links with others like themselves, with whom they share
common interests, and in particular people of the same ethnicity or the same social background.8
If people can choose the area where they live, they would rather move into neighborhoods where
people are similar to themselves. If individuals who are not constrained with respect to the location
of their home choose to gather along ethnic lines, then the richest individuals will be able to move
into the most homogeneous neighborhoods. Therefore, the level of diversity of the neighborhoods is
probably endogenous and any estimates on the implications of diversity will be biased. In particular,
if the wealthy families that live in diverse settings are those that have a taste for diversity, the true
effect of diversity on social outcomes should be smaller in absolute terms.9
To identify the effect of ethnic diversity, one must therefore study individuals who are assigned to
their place of residence without consideration of ethnic characteristics. The purpose of this section is
to bring forth evidence that spatial allocation of households across public housing blocks in France
can be considered as exogenous with respect to ethnic characteristics due to French regulation.
Naturally, the sample of households that apply to public housing dwellings is endogenous with
respect to economic, social or cultural characteristics. But among the pool of selected households,
we show that their spatial allocation across the public housing blocks of a given department is
exogenous with respect to their ethnic characteristics, conditional on their other characteristics.
We also want to stress that the mere fact of working at the block level already decreases the
extent of endogenous sorting. First, although households can generally choose the neighborhood in
which they move, they may not be able to select a particular block in a given neighborhood. Second,
while it is possible to have an idea of the socio-economic and demographic characteristics of a given
neighborhood, it is much more difficult to observe such characteristics in a specific block prior to
moving. Bayer, Ross and Topa (2008) rely on this key assumption and provide empirical evidence
that individuals characteristics are not correlated within blocks.
3.1 An ethnically-blind allocation process built into law
We first document the actual process of allocation of households across public housing dwellings. This
gives a legal basis to our identifying assumption of the absence of self-sorting on ethnic characteristics
8Race, or ethnicity, is the most salient characteristic along which homophilious relationship form.
9Combes, Decreuse, Schmutz and Trannoy (2010) use customer discrimination theory to show that owners will
tend to discriminate against ethnic minorities when renting their apartment, bringing new evidence of why any causal
claim of ethnic diversity on public goods in the private housing market would be biased.
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in the public housing sector.10 In France, the only eligibility requirements for admittance into the
public housing sector are to be legally living in France (as a French citizen or migrant with a valid
residence permit) and to be living under a certain threshold of income per unit of consumption.
This income ceiling is usually rather high: in 2009, this threshold was between 36,748 and 50,999
Euros per year for a four-person family, depending on the region of residence (the upper figure is
nearly 3,000 Euros higher than the average disposable income of four-person households in 2007).
Using the 2002 Housing Survey data, Jacquot (2007) estimates that given their income, between two
thirds and four fifths of households living in Metropolitan France could apply for a public housing
unit. As a consequence, the population eligible for public housing is about three times as large as
the available space in vacant dwellings. This implies that other criteria must be taken into account
in the distribution process. Hence, in addition to the income of the household, family situation
and household size are taken into account to ensure a suitable match with the characteristics of
vacant dwellings, as well as the emergency of the application. These are actually the main criteria
used by the commission due to the boom in housing prices in the private sector during the mid-
90s and the 2000s. In particular, five priority criteria are defined by law (Article L441-1 of law
relative to construction and housing - Code pour la Construction et l’Habitat) at the national level
to ensure that vacant housing will first be distributed to households with obvious social difficulties.
Households satisfying these priority criteria are those in which there is a (mentally or physically)
disabled person, those living in precarious or hazardous shelter due to financial constraints, those
living in a temporary accommodation, individuals living in a precarious shelter who recently found
a job after a long unemployment spell, and spouse-abused individuals.
To get on the queue for a housing unit, households submit a form revealing their identity and
family situation, their employment status and the resources of the household, the reasons for ap-
plying to the public housing sector (currently or soon to be homeless, or reasons related to health
situation, family situation, job situation, inappropriate current housing, unpleasant environment),
the type of housing looked for, whether the applicant is disabled and whether this is the first appli-
cation. It is important to stress the fact that the application form contains very limited information
about the ethnicity of the applicant: he or she only needs to inform about his or her nationality,
which is limited to three possible categories (French, European Union, or non European Union).
We now document the selection process of the applicants. The commissions of selection in charge
of allocating households to vacant public housing dwellings are held at the department level (or at
the city level in the case of Paris which is both a city and a department due to its size).11 The
composition of the commissions is regulated by law: it includes six members of the public housing
10The process of allocation across public housing blocks in France is mainly inspired by theories from Le Corbus-
ier (1887-1965). Le Corbusier insisted that France must avoid the homogeneous ghettoes of the urban landscapes
elsewhere, and should therefore allocate housing blind to ethnicity, not permitting family networks to grow within
housing establishments. These ideas were translated into state regulation (Bernardot, 2008).
11Metropolitan France is divided into 22 large administrative areas, called régions (regions henceforth), and into 96
smaller administrative areas, called départements (departments henceforth). Each department is hence a subdivision
of a region, and several departments can belong to the same region. Each department is administered by an elected
General Council (Conseil Général) and its President, whose main areas of responsibility include the management of
a number of social and welfare programs, junior high schools (collèges), buildings and technical staff, local roads,
schools, rural buses, and municipal infrastructure.
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offices board, a representative of associations for social and economic insertion (appointed by the
head of the department -préfet), mayors of the cities (or districts) in which vacant housings are to
be attributed, as well as a representative of any association defending tenant rights. In addition,
another department representative may attend the commission. For each vacant housing unit, at
least three households must be considered by the commissioners, who finally decide which household
will be allocated to which housing unit, according to the eligibility and priority criteria detailed
above. Other criteria such as the number of children in the household are also taken into account
in order to allocate suitable dwellings.12
With the allocation process regulated by legal rules at the national level, it seems unlikely that
households can be allocated according to their origin. The main concern of the commissions is to
favor socially endangered households, as shown by the priority criteria. Finally and most impor-
tantly perhaps, any decision based on the origin of an applicant, i.e. discriminating on this basis, is
prohibited in France. Public housing offices are also regularly audited. If evidence of discrimination
is detected, they are judged and punished accordingly. This is why the lawyers Rouquette and Lip-
ietz (1991) stress that the rules of allocation of public housing units that prohibit "localism", and
the high administrative barriers that effectively prohibit exchanges of lodgings except for changing
spatial needs of families, make the allocation of public housing units largely exogenous with respect
to the ethnic origins of the applicants.
Despite this legal process of allocation, one might still be worried about the possibility of self-
sorting of households that refuse the residential allocation proposed by the commission. In theory,
households can refuse up to three offers. However, self-sorting, especially on ethnic characteristics,
seems unlikely to be a common practice. Residential mobility within the public housing sector is
very low, due to the current strong shortage of supply of public housing dwellings. This makes it
unlikely that the selected households could be really picky about the diversity of their neighborhood
(see the study by Simon, 2003). In addition, rents are considerably lower in public housing than in
private housing, increasing the opportunity cost of moving, so that the turnover is very low. More
specifically, the mobility rate in the public housing sector is even lower than for recent owners. Using
12Public housing allocation in Paris serves as a useful concrete example. We draw on the official audit of Observatoire
du Logement et de l’Habitat de Paris (2011). Paris is a special case as it is, due to its size, a department as well as a
city. The application form, the commission, and the allocation process thus take place in Paris, at the city level. As
of January 2010, there were 186,017 public housing dwellings in Paris. Public housing buildings are scattered across
all Parisian areas, with a high concentration (69 percent) in six districts (the 13th, 14th, 15th, 18th, 19th and 20th
arrondissements). Within Paris, 48.7 percent of households are under the income ceiling and could be theoretically
eligible. In practice, only households with very modest incomes apply (71 percent have an income lower than the
minimum ceiling for all France, equivalent to 2,345 euros per month for a household with two children). On the 31st
of December 2010, there were 121,937 ongoing applications, to be compared to 12,500 public housing units allocated
over the year 2010. The breakdown of the population that were granted a public housing unit in 2010 is the following.
67.7 percent came from precarious housing, 28.8 percent came from the private rental sector, and 2.3 percent came
from the public housing sector. In the latter case, those are people who moved for larger space following an increase
in their household size (only 12 percent of the public housing dwellings have more than three rooms). The mobility
rate (defined as the ratio of new entrants over the total number of public housing dwellings) is particularly low: it
reaches 5.5 percent in 2010. It is formally possible to indicate a precise neighborhood in the application form, but
in practice, very few applicants (6.6 percent) do provide this information. More than half of the 121,937 applicants
(52.9 percent) did not mention any particular area at all, probably due to the fear of being rejected on this ground.
Among those who indicated an area of preference, 91.2 percent mentioned the area where they were already living.
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data from the 2002 Housing Survey, Debrand and Taffin (2005) give precise measures of the mobility
rate: it amounts to 10.3 percent for new owners, to 15.9 percent for tenants in the private housing
sector, but only to 9.9 percent for tenants in the public housing sector. While even 9.9 percent may
seem high, we show in section 7.2 that when households move, they almost never achieve a placement
in a less diverse setting in the public sector. Besides, the mobility rates seem to have become even
lower in recent years due to the boom of prices in the private sector, as shown in the Parisian case
in footnote 11. The authors also document an increase in the gap in the mobility rates between
the private and the public rental markets: there is was 6 point difference in 2002, to be compared
to a 0.8 point difference in 1984. As a consequence of the size of the eligible population and of
the low turnover, the waiting periods are rather long: the 2002 Housing Survey documents that
over one third of the population applying for a public housing unit had been waiting for more than
one year. A closer look at the distribution of waiting periods reveals a difference between natives
and immigrants, but this difference is washed out once we control for household characteristics: the
main determinant of a longer waiting period is household size. This is not surprising, as the public
housing market in France is characterized by a shortage of large apartments. This is part of the
explanation of the difference in waiting period between immigrants and native French, as the former
tend to have more children than the latter, on average.
In a word, the public housing market is very tight, and highly regulated. This implies that
households have very limited control over the time when they will be assigned a public housing
dwelling and the precise place where it will be located. This is especially true at the block level,
which is our level of analysis. This gives some initial support to our assumption that the distribu-
tion of households across public housing blocks is blind to ethnic characteristics and preferences of
households.
3.2 Tests on quasi-random distribution of ethnic groups shares across public
housing blocks
In the remainder of this section, we provide a more formal statistical test to show that the spatial
allocation of households across public housing blocks within a given locality is exogenous with respect
to ethnic characteristics. We focus here on what we see as the most stringent test on the spatial
distribution of residents, which consists in comparing the observed distribution with a random
distribution. This allows us to test directly our assumption of quasi-randomness of the allocation of
households across public housing blocks within a given area.
In Section 7, we perform a variety of alternative tests. First, we show that while households moving
into a new neigborhood tend to self-segregate in the unconstrained private housing market, there
is no such evidence in the public housing market. This test points out the absence of self-selection
along ethnic lines among the movers. But self-selection could occur prior to the move. Thus we
also look at households that have refused a public housing dwelling offer. We show that households
that have refused an offer end up living in public housing blocks that display the same ELF as those
who accepted their first offer. Thus even if households try to be choosy with respect to the ethnic
composition of their neighborhoods, they cannot self-segregate in the public housing sector due to
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the allocation process and the tight supply constraints of dwellings.
We now document our test on the quasi-random residential allocation in the public housing sec-
tor. As mentioned in section 3.1, the allocation of households across public housing blocks takes
place at the department level. If the members of the commission follow the legal criteria and do
not take into account the ethnic characteristics in the allocation process, we should find an equal
distribution of households of a given nationality across the various public housing blocks within each
department. For the sake of illustration, let us assume that 10 percent of Maghrebians live in the
public housing sector in Paris. We should find the same share of 10 percent of Maghrebians within
each Parisian housing block if the allocation was truly exogenous with respect to ethnic charac-
teristics. Naturally, this equality of distribution of ethnic groups shares across housing blocks can
hold only if we have a sufficiently large number of individuals within each housing block. Instead,
in the 1999 Population Census database, we only observe an average of 18.4 different individuals
out of the whole population living in each block (same average in the Labor Force Survey). This is
due to the sampling strategy of the French National Institute of Statistics and Economics (INSEE)
that interviews only a subsample of adjacent households from the overall block. With such a small
sample size of observations at the block level, any analytical test of equality of distribution of ethnic
groups shares across blocks would fail. We thus use Monte Carlo simulation to reproduce an artifi-
cially random distribution of the population. We randomly reallocate the public housing population
across the different blocks within each department, and then compare this random distribution to
the actual distribution.
Let us now describe more precisely this last test. Using the 1999 Census data, we pool the public
housing population from each department, and reallocate it randomly across the different public
housing blocks of the corresponding department, taking into account the demographic structure of
each neighborhood. In order to avoid composition effects due to existing families, we restrict our
sample to household heads. We also restrict our sample to the neighborhoods where we observe at
least five percent of Maghrebians to focus on areas where we have sufficient observations to perform
this test. After simulating a random distribution of ethnic groups shares as explained above, we
compare the actual and the simulated distributions of native French and Maghrebians shares across
neighborhoods. We first run a simple t-test of equality of means. Then we conduct a Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test, which is a more demanding test of equality of distributions.
Table 3 reports the percentage of departments for which the actual and simulated distributions
of ethnic shares across neighborhoods are similar, i.e. those for which we cannot reject the null
hypothesis at the 10% level. The labels in the first column indicate the ethnic group for which we
compare the distributions of the shares across neighborhoods. The second column shows that there
is no department for which we can reject the null hypothesis that the real and simulated distributions
of the ethnic group shares have equal means. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test results are displayed
in the third column. According to this test, the actual and simulated distributions of native French
shares across HLM neighborhoods are similar in 98.61 percent of the departments. When we focus
on Maghrebians shares, we find that the two distributions are alike in 98 percent of departments as
well. All in all, those tests are in line with the idea that the distribution of the households eligible
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for public housing across the housing blocks can be considered as exogenous with respect to ethnic
characteristics.
4 Results
4.1 Specification
This section estimates the impact of diversity on social relationships and public goods at the local
housing block level. We identify the effect of diversity by using data from the public housing sector
where households are exogenously allocated with respect to ethnic characteristics. Let j, k and l
indicate respectively households, buildings and blocks. For each outcome, we estimate the following
equation:
Yjkl = α+ βELFl + γXj + δZk + µWl + εjkl (2)
where Yjkl denotes the housing outcome we are interested in, as stated by household j in building
k and block l, ELFl is the level of ethnic diversity in the block, Xj is a vector of household char-
acteristics, Zk a vector of building characteristics and Wl a vector of socio-economic characteristics
of the block. We also control for department fixed effects since the spatial allocation of households
across public housings is decided at the department level.13 All results derive from OLS estimates,
with robust standard errors clustered at the block level.14
We control for a large set of household characteristics: age, gender, level of education, labor
market status and nationality15 of the household head, as well as household size, and total house-
hold income per member. We also control for building characteristics, with the (log)-number of
apartments in the housing project, and its date of construction. Indeed, the size and the number of
occupants might affect the ability of the households to coordinate for improving the commons or to
enforce norms, while the age of the building might explain part of the degradations observed and
tenant satisfaction.
An important issue is whether the degree of fractionalization is picking up various dimensions of
the environment where people are living, including the extent of inequality and the unemployment
rate or the socio-economic background of the neighborhood (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002). We
therefore include a very detailed classification in 27 categories of the socio-economic environment
of each neighborhood, constructed by Nicole Tabard (2002) from the INSEE. This classification
characterizes each area according to the socio-professional category and the occupation of all men
in the area. We use the classification that was built using the 1999 census data. This variable is the
most detailed one available in French national surveys to capture the socio-economic background
of an area. We also include the unemployment rate computed at the block level using the 1999
Population Census data. Finally, we include department fixed effects.
13Results were unaltered by the inclusion of city fixed effect to account for the fact that the mayors are members
of the attribution committee.
14We have also run logistic regressions on dummy outcomes, with similar results. To ease the interpretation of the
coefficients, we will report the OLS estimates henceforth.
15We distinguish between the following categories for nationalities: French at birth, naturalized French, from other
European countries, Maghrebian, Sub-Saharan African, Asian and all others.
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4.2 The effect of fractionalization on the opinion about housing conditions
We start by documenting the impact of diversity on the overall satisfaction about housing conditions.
From the HS, we use the question: "In general how do you judge the quality of your housing
conditions?". The variable takes on values from 1, for very good, to 5 for very bad. Over the public
housing population, the average of this variable is of 2.5, with a 0.98 standard deviation. This
question on well-being related to housing conditions is rather general. We will detail the different
dimensions that could affect this well-being in the following subsection.
Table 4 shows that ethnic diversity has a negative effect on satisfaction with housing condition,
statistically significant at the 5 percent level. A one standard deviation increase in ethnic diversity
generates an increase in the dissatisfaction with housing conditions that amounts to 6.7 percent
of its standard deviation. To get a better sense of the magnitude of this effect, we can say that
the increase in the dissatisfaction with housing conditions generated by a one standard deviation
increase in block unemployment rate corresponds to 13.1 percent of its standard deviation. Thus the
effect of diversity on satisfaction is as sizeable as half the effect of the local unemployment rate. Two
other variables seem to be related to household satisfaction with housing conditions: members of
larger households tend to be less satisfied with their housing condition, while those living in newer
buildings (constructed after 1990) have a significantly better opinion on the subject than others.
Finally, older and more educated individuals also complain less than others, but to a lesser extent.16
4.3 The various effects of diversity
4.3.1 Vandalism, Housing quality and Public Safety
This section looks further at the various dimensions of the dissatisfaction with housing conditions
that could be affected by ethnic fractionalization. The HS covers a large variety of questions on social
relationships and the quality of the housing environment. Table 5 reports descriptive statistics of
the outcomes we look at. To organize the discussion about those questions, we distinguish three
main dimensions: (a) Behaviors and Public goods that are directly under the control of the tenants.
This category includes in particular the neglect or voluntary degradations that may be imputable
to the tenants, (b) Behaviors and Public goods that are under the control of the landlords. This
category include in particular the poor quality of housing due to a lack of maintenance and repairs
by the landlords and (c) Interpersonal conflict and hatred social relationship. This category includes
personal aggression and robberies to which we refer as civil conflicts or public safety. We have also
run an exploratory factor analysis that yields similar, if not identical, categories. Appendix C reports
the results obtained with the three indices resulting from the factor analysis.
The first dimension of housing quality refers to actions or goods that are largely under the
control of the tenants. In this category, we include all the variables reporting neglect or voluntary
deterioration in the common areas of the building. First, households are asked a general question
on degradations: "Were the common areas of your building (lobby, staircase, floors) vandalized or
16The results reported in 4 also show that people of Asian nationalities tend to be more satisfied with their housing
condition than native French. However, we do not give much credit to this figure given that we observe only 9 Asian
individuals in the public housing sector in our dataset.
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neglected (destruction, deterioration) over the last twelve months?". The answers are 1 for "Never",
2 for "Minor degradations" and 3 for "Major or very frequent degradations". Households are then
asked to mention which kind of degradations they observed over the previous year. They can choose
several possible answers from the following list: graffiti or degradations of the walls (or on the floor),
trash and litter on the floor, broken windows, broken doors, broken light bulbs, degradation of mail
boxes, degradation of the entry phone or entry code, deterioration of the elevator. For each outcome,
the variable is coded as 1 in case of a degradation, and 0 otherwise. All those items refer more
or less directly to a willful degradation. We will thus refer to this set of questions as the category
Vandalism. We also include in this category a question about noise pollution:17 "How frequently are
you disturbed by the noise in your housing during the day?", "During the night?". The answers are
1 for "Infrequently or never", 2 for "Rather frequently", and 3 for "Very frequently".
The second category we consider refers to goods that are not directly produced or altered by
residents. But they might be related to diversity by the lack of maintenance and repairs by the
HLM office to improve the housing quality. We will henceforth label this category Poor Quality of
Housing. We include in this category variables corresponding to housing problems that can neither
be caused nor solved by the tenants, but for which HLM offices are responsible. The households
are first asked: "How would you qualify the way the common areas of your building are maintained
and taken care of (cleaning, maintenance of collective facilities: lighting, trash cans,...)?". The
answer ranges from 1 for good, to 2 for average, and 3 for bad. More specific questions are also
asked: "How does the façade of your building look?",18 "What is the quality of the soundproofing
of your housing?",19 "Was the elevator out of order during more than 24 hours over the past three
months?",20 "Did you experience toilet issues (leaks, flush breakdown, drainage problem) over the
last three months?", or "Did you experience coldness in your apartment during more than 24 hours
over the past twelve months?". We also include more detailed questions concerning the origin of
coldness: "Did you experience coldness because of a bad insulation?", "Did you experience coldness
because the heating equipment broke down ?" and "Did you experience coldness because of a poor
heating equipment?". For all the previous questions, the variable is 1 when the answer is "Yes" and
0 otherwise.
The last category of questions refers to personal aggressions and criminality. We will label this
category Public Safety. Three questions correspond to this category: "Have you, or a member of
your household, been a victim of or a witness to physical aggression in your neighborhood during
the last twelve months?", "Have you, or a member of your household, been a victim of or a witness
to a robbery in your neighborhood during the last twelve months?", and "Have you been victim of
a burglary (or any attempt) over the past twelve months?". For these three questions, the variable
equals 1 in case of the event, and zero otherwise.
17The underlying assumption is that the source of the noise in the hallways and apartments of the building is not
due to poor soundproofing. As a matter of fact, we see in the following sections that more diversity increases the
disturbance related to noise, but fails to explain the quality of soundproofing.
18There are five possible answers: 1=As new, 2=Good, 3=Average, 4=Dirty, 5= Bad, with cracks, 6=Very bad,
the building threatens to collapse.
19The possible answers are: 1=Good, 2=Average, 3=Bad.
20In contrast, the question mentioned in the Vandalism section refers to the interior status of the elevator rather
than its mechanical breakdown.
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4.3.2 Results
Tables 6 to 8 show the effect of ethnic fractionalization on the various outcomes corresponding to
the three different dimensions: "Vandalism", "Quality of housing" and "Public Safety". For each
outcome, we run a separate regression according to equation 2, using the largest set of control
variables we could think of. More precisely, we report the results when we control for households
characteristics, building characteristics (which may explain a large part of the degradations observed
in the housing projects), neighborhood characteristics and department fixed effects.
Table 6 reports the effect of ethnic diversity on outcomes related to voluntary degradations and
vandalism. We report the results in the public housing environment, with the full set of controls as
detailed above. For almost all the outcomes considered, the estimated effect of ethnic diversity is
statistically significant at the 1 percent level,21 and is sizeable. Let us for instance look at the results
for graffiti in the full-specification: a one standard deviation increase in ethnic diversity is associated
with a rise by 5.6 percentage points in the probability of observing graffiti, which represents 12.8
percent of the total standard deviation of this outcome. The effect of ethnic diversity is comparable
to the effect of local unemployment: a one standard deviation increase in block unemployment rate
is associated with a rise by 4.56 percentage in the probability of observing graffiti. Regarding the
deterioration of elevators, a one standard deviation increase in ethnic diversity induces a 4.9 per-
centage points increase in the probability of observing degradation of the elevator, which represents
16.7 percent of the total standard deviation of this outcome. This effect is once again as sizeable
as that of the local unemployment rate. Note also that the size of the building (i.e. the number of
housings) has a strong positive impact on all the outcomes related to vandalism.
The second set of regressions, presented in Table 7 shows the effect of diversity on outcomes
signaling poor quality of housing. The coefficient associated with ethnic diversity is generally signif-
icant, except for the outcome related to the quality of soundproofing.22 More diverse neighborhood
are characterized by a lower care of the commons by the persons in charge, a poorer condition of the
façade, more frequent concerns with heating, more frequent elevator breakdowns and toilet issues. It
is worth noting that the estimated effects of diversity are much lower than those found for outcomes
associated with vandalism. Consider the outcome associated with the probability that the elevator
is out of order. We find that when the ELF increases by one standard deviation, the probability that
the elevator was out of order during at least 24 hours over the last three months rises by 1.9 percent-
age points. This corresponds to only 5.24% of the standard deviation of this outcome. If we now
turn to heating issues, our results indicate that a one standard deviation increase in ethnic diversity
is associated with a rise by 2.43 percentage points in the probability to have experienced insufficient
heat in the apartment during more than 24 hours over the past year, which represents 6.41 percent
of the total standard deviation of this outcome. The date of construction of the building is also an
important explanatory variable for most of the outcomes related to general housing quality, as it
21The exception is for the indicator for broken doors and noise during the day, for which the effect of diversity is
only significant at the 5% level.
22Two other variables are not explained by diversity, but these are not outcomes per se. These variables are reasons
why the household experience coldness in the apartment.
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accounts for the general state of capital equipment under the responsibility of the public housing
office (heating, façade, soundproofing,...). Living in a more recent building decreases particularly
the probability to report poor condition of the outside walls, low quality of insulation or poor quality
of soundproofing.
Finally, Table 8 reports the results for outcomes related to public safety, capturing direct aggres-
sion, robberies and burglaries. Remarkably, it shows that ethnic diversity does not have a significant
impact on any of these outcome variables in our preferred specification. This finding is consistent
with Fearon and Laitin (1996), who argue that despite inter-ethnic relations being generally more
tense, in-group policing mechanisms typically keep violence off of the equilibrium path.
In sum, and taking advantage of data at a more micro level than has heretofore been available,
we see that fractionalization operates with different degrees of impact for different sorts of public
goods and social relationships.23 To be sure, results are not significant for all of the outcomes that
we examine. But overall, the results are clear that fractionalization at the local level increases
vandalism by a great deal, decreases building maintenance by a moderate (but overall significant)
degree, and has no effect on security. These findings allow us (as we do in the next section) to
propose the various channels through which fractionalization works in the provision of public goods.
4.3.3 Rationalization of the channels
To rationalize our findings, we propose different interpretations of the channels through which frac-
tionalization affects social relationships and local public goods. The category "Vandalism" refers
to the neglect or voluntary degradations of the common areas of the building, such as damaging
common property, graffiti, or depositing trash on the floor. These are outcomes over which public
housing residents have control and for which they can be held responsible.24 The category "Quality
of housing" include variables such as the condition of the outside walls, quality of soundproofing
or coldness in the apartment. Those variables are more the responsibility of the public housing
managers. Finally, the "Public Safety" category represents outcomes that are less under the control
of local authorities than of the state police. We find that both locally controlled outcomes are nega-
tively affected by diversity, and we provide a different rationalization of the channels for each type.
Our interpretation for the results on "Vandalism" is that diversity prevents the creation of social
norms to punish defectors, as the threat of social sanctions is lower across groups. The other-
regarding preferences are less effective in more diverse areas. This has been a standard result in
the literature since the seminal work of Coleman (1988), and it helps explain why we observe more
voluntary degradations with diversity. Supporting our intuition, many households living in the pub-
lic housing sector report having "no relationship at all" with their neighbors, rather than "bad" or
"very bad relationships", which can be a barrier to the creation of other-regarding social norms.
The increase in graffiti in more diverse areas might also illustrate the need to mark one’s territory
23Our findings are unchanged with regressions on aggregated indices obtained with a principal component analysis
(see Appendix C), and with a mean effect analysis (see Appendix C).
24Given that residents need to enter a code in order to gain entry into their building, it is unlikely these degradations
are coming from outsiders.
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in a context where several groups co-exist.
We understand the result on "Quality of housing" as the inability of more heterogeneous com-
munities to undertake collective action that would pressure the public housing office into improving
housing quality. This could be sustained (though we have no direct evidence to support this) by
beliefs in the housing directorate that it need not maintain public goods to high standards in het-
erogeneous housing projects because the likelihood of collective action against it is minimal. In this
sense, the resulting poor housing quality associated with ethnic diversity can be seen as an equi-
librium in which the lack of expectations of collective action would fail to incentivize the housing
directorate to make costly improvements.25 Coming back to the results concerning heating issues,
we can find some support for this assumption: we find that households living in more diverse neigh-
borhoods not only report more heating failures, but also report that this is due to the poor quality
of the heating equipment, an appliance typically under the control of the HLM office.26
Finally, we can think of two possible interpretations of the absence of any diversity effect on
aggressions and robberies. First, this could result from more physical security provided by the city
and state police in more diverse neighborhoods. The second explanation would be that individuals
living in the public housing sector in general experience social anomie. In fact, one third (32.7 per-
cent) of the public housing population, irrespective of diversity, declares to have no relationship at
all with individuals living in their same area. In addition, we find that individuals living in a more
diverse neighborhood tend to even more social anomie and fewer relationships with their neighbors.
To summarize, our interpretation is that diversity generates social anomie, i.e. the absence
of common rules and social norms. As a consequence of anomie, there is (a) less other-regarding
preferences, hence more neglect and vandalism, (b) a failure to generate collective action to pressure
the public housing offices into improving housing quality, and (c) fewer opportunities for violent
confrontation at all levels of diversity. We also interpret the lack of an effect of diversity on violence
by security provided at a higher level of administration, not subject to the constraints of local
diversity.
4.3.4 Interpretation of the channels based on Repairs
We bring additional evidence on the interpretation of the channels by looking at maintenance and
repairs performed in the building. Note first that these outcomes add an objective dimension to
the previous subjective questions. The variation in the effects of diversity on the number of repairs
depending on the type of public good also helps us to tease out the different channels through which
diversity operates.
The Housing Survey asks whether elevators, staircase, windows, heating equipment, security
25The collective action could also influence mayor’s office. But the political logic of the public housing support is
beyond the scope of the paper
26Another possible reason for having experienced coldness in the apartment that the household can mention is to
have restricted heating in order to save money. The results are not reported here, but we find no significant effect of
diversity on this outcome, in any specification.
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equipment, and so on, have been repaired or installed during the previous year. We build three
measures of repairs, corresponding to our three general outcomes. We define a first variable tracking
repairs that can be fixed internally by the tenants. Those repairs concern staircase, windows, doors
and lights of the commons, i.e repairs related to neglect or voluntary degradations. A second vari-
able indicates repairs that can be fixed only by the external intervention of the public housing office.
Those repairs include revamping of the façade, or interventions to improve, among other things, the
heating system or insulation quality, i.e. repairs related to the general quality of housing. Finally,
we build a third variable accounting for the installation of security equipment in the building, which
can be related to conflicts outcomes. We then regress each of these three variables (as well as less
aggregated indicators of repairs) on the level of diversity of the block, controlling for factors that
could explain the number of repairs: the number of dwellings in the building, and its date of con-
struction. Table 9 reports these OLS estimates.
Column 1 of Table 9 reveals a positive and statistically significant correlation between the prob-
ability of repairs inside the building (windows, doors, lights... in the common areas) and local
diversity: the more the diversity, the more the work for repairing the effects of vandalism. In the
main regressions of the paper presented in section 4.3.2 (corresponding to the Table 6), we found
that voluntary degradations increase with diversity. This implies that the larger number of repairs
results from greater need due to a lack of publicly spirited social norms rather than from greater
responsiveness by the housing authorities to regular maintenance.
Column 2 shows a negative and statistically significant correlation between the number of sub-
stantial works in the building (façade, heating, insulation...) and local diversity: the more the
diversity, the less the work asked by the landlords for improving the general quality of housing.
In the main regressions presented in section 4.3.2 (corresponding to the Table 7), we found that
more diversity implies a lower quality of housing. Thus, it seems that more diverse neighborhoods
are deprived of such substantial work, although the inhabitants actually complain (individually to
survey enumerators) about the quality of housing. This supports our intuition that tenants in more
diverse neighborhoods are unable to engage in collective action to pressure the public housing offices
into undertaking important works.
Finally Column 3 shows a positive and statistically significant correlation between the existence
of security equipment and local diversity. In the main regressions presented in section 4.3.2 (corre-
sponding to the Table 8), we found no impact of diversity on aggression and robberies. The presence
of security equipment in more diverse neighborhood might be part of the explanation of the absence
of diversity effect on burglaries. In addition, it is supportive of our idea that vandalism in the
common areas of the buildings is imputable to the tenants, who have access to the building.
5 Robustness checks on self-reported quality of public goods
One concern in the previous analysis is related to the subjective nature of the outcome variables
used in our study. Self-reported perceptions might reflect personal bias rather than be correlated
with objective measures of public good provision. Perhaps people are just happier when they are
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surrounded by people more like themselves, and this is reflected in their answer to the quality of
housing. We conduct several tests challenging this alternative explanation of personal bias.
First, as mentioned in the previous section, the HS provides information about various types
of repairs and work that have been done in the building or in the housing unit over the previous
year. These variables present the advantage of being objective. The lower part of Table 9 reports
simple correlations between the various outcomes and the associated repairs. We find that most
of our subjective outcomes are strongly and positively correlated with the existence of repairs, i.e.
objective outcomes, especially for the variables related to vandalism.27 This is our initial evidence
of the reliability of our subjective measures of housing quality and well-being.
We then conduct more formal tests. We replicate the regression on the dissatisfaction with
housing conditions (section 4.2) including interaction terms between diversity and the various ethnic
groups. Those estimates reveal whether different groups react in different ways to the level of diver-
sity of their neighborhood. Column 2 of Table 10 shows that there does not seem to be a different
effect for the various groups, and the coefficient for diversity remains unchanged (see Column 1 for
the baseline specification). Then we concentrate on actual differences between "pure French" house-
holds28 and fully Maghrebian households’ dissatisfaction with housing conditions. In particular, we
interact the dummies of being in a fully native French household or being in a fully Maghrebian
household with the ELF: none of the coefficients is significant (see Table 10, Column 3). Thus for
any given level of diversity, there is no significant difference in the answers given by pure French
and fully Maghrebian households. In other words, the idea that bad opinions of housing conditions
are driven by average bad feelings due to being surrounded by foreigners can be rejected. Moreover,
including these additional controls only slightly affects the magnitude of the ethnic diversity coeffi-
cient, and does not affect its direction or its significance.
An alternative test to show that subjective perceptions have an objective foundation is to look
at how much within-housing project variation there is in perceptions. We regress self-reported per-
ception on housing project fixed effects and individual characteristics. Once we control for housing
project fixed effects, assuming there is no within-project variation in public goods, the remainder of
the variation tells us if certain ethnic or socio-demographic groups are more likely to be positively or
negatively biased. If perceptions have a high signal-to-noise ratio, there should be less within-project
variation because perceptions would be a good signal of project level public goods. Table 11 shows
the regressions of our main indicator of satisfaction about housing conditions on individual charac-
teristics. Column 1 shows the within-housing project estimates by including housing project fixed
effects, exploiting variation within public housing. Column 2 shows the between-housing project
estimates. Column 1 shows that the only individual characteristics statistically significantly corre-
lated with within-project variation in the perception of the environment are age and household size.
27An exception is the condition of the outside walls, which is negatively correlated with the probability that façade
work was done. This is not surprising as the assessment of the façade’s condition is done at the time of the survey,
while repairs concern the previous year.
28Both children and parents were born French in France.
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Income, education or the country of origin of the households are uncorrelated with perceptions of
the environment. We also compute the standard deviation in the perception of the quality of hous-
ing between public housing projects and within public housing projects. The standard deviation is
almost twice as high across blocks (.801) than within blocks (.435), and this difference is statistically
significant. In sum, low levels of within block variation on perceptions adds confidence that there is
an objective foundation for tenants’ subjective reports.
Finally, we also estimate the effect of diversity on the perception of the quality of public goods
that are financed by the city, the department or the state rather than locally financed by the HLM
offices. If there is a reporting bias in general, then, the effect on all types of public goods should
be the same. If it is related to localized collective action failures, then the impact should only be
on locally provided/maintained public goods. Thus this test provides both an additional robustness
check on the channels through which diversity affects public goods and on the absence of a reporting
bias. The local public goods we have focused on so far (except for individuals’ protection) are
provided or maintained by the private company that owns and manages the public housing building.
We now consider public goods that are managed at the city or department level. In the HS, three
public goods enter this category. The first one is the perception of the quality of roads and streets
with the following question: "What is your opinion about the maintenance of the streets, roads
and public spaces in the area?". The second question measures the access to public transportation:
"What is your opinion about the accessibility of your area by public transportation?". The third
item measures the accessibility of the area by private transportation: "What is your opinion about
the accessibility of your area by private vehicles (parking, congestion)?". The answer ranges for all
three questions from 1 for good, 2 for neither good nor bad to 3 for bad. Table 12 reports the
OLS estimates, controlling for all the previous household and local characteristics in addition to
department fixed effects. We find that ethnic fractionalization is neither correlated with the quality
of public spaces and roads in the areas (Column 1), nor with public transportation (Column 2),
nor with car parking and general congestion (Column 3). Again, our confidence that the subjective
reports to enumerators on housing quality have an objective foundation is increased.
6 Further tests: Fractionalization and ethnic shares
The basic regressions measure ethnic diversity using a standard ELF, controlling for household,
building and neighborhood characteristics. Yet, as suggested by Vigdor (2002), it might be important
to control for ethnic group shares to get a more comprehensive set of covariates for diversity. Column
1 of Table 13 reports the results once we control for ethnic group shares.29 The estimated impact
of ELF is now even stronger than in the previous specifications, confirming the robustness of our
result along this dimension.
Moreover, we run regressions replacing the fractionalization index by ethnic groups shares (Col-
umn 2 of Table 13), and by ethnic group shares and their square (Column 3 of Table 13), controlling
29In Table 13, we aggregate the various nationalities at birth into six different categories. The results are similar
when we work with more detailed shares for all nationalities. The share of native French is the omitted category.
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for the usual individual and local characteristics. Only one group (Maghrebian) seems to have a
significantly negative effect on the dissatisfaction with housing conditions: the higher the share of
Magrhebians in a block (relative to the share of French), the more likely individuals are to complain
about their housing conditions. However, this negative effect decreases with the share of Maghre-
bians. From this result, we infer that our measure of diversity reflects not only the actual ethnic
composition of the neighborhood, but also that some ethnic groups might have different effects on
self-reported perceptions of the quality of public spaces as they become a majority of the neighbor-
hood population. However, this result does not call into question the effect of diversity per se on
which we have already reported (Column 1 of Table 13).
Finally, we re-run our main regressions using an alternative fractionalization index, trying to
encompass another dimension of diversity. More precisely, in order to account for communication
issues potentially related to the diversity of origins, we compute an alternative fractionalization
index based on a proxy for French speaking. We use information provided by the International
Organisation of La Francophonie to group countries according to the share of the population that is
French speaking (in 2010). Their classification allows us to distinguish among six groups of countries:
countries which are not members of the organisation,30 countries in which French speakers represent
less than 5 percent of the population, countries in which French speakers represent between 5 and 15
percent of the population, countries in which French speakers represent between 16 and 35 percent
of the population, countries in which French speakers represent between 36 and 60 percent of the
population, and countries in which French speakers represent more than 60 percent of the population.
We then assign one of the six French-speaking levels to each individual (from the 1999 census
dataset), according to his or her nationality at birth. This sorting of individuals captures the
probability that they actually speak French. Finally, we compute a standard ELF for each block
(using the same methodology as for our main index of diversity) relying on the shares of the block
population belonging to one of the six groups.
We replicate the regressions of the paper31 using this alternative index instead of the one based
on nationality at birth. The results are reported in Table 14. Each coefficient comes from a separate
regression. The columns indicate the four dependent variables under study. Panel A and panel B
respectively correspond to the measure of diversity used in each regression. Our results are unaffected
when we use the new index based on French speaking origin. This is not very surprising given that
the correlation between the two indices is very large (98.45 %).
30For these countries, the organisation does not provide any data, but we can reasonably assume that the share of
French speaking population in non-member countries is close to zero.
31We replicate the regression of the dissatisfaction with housing conditions (Columns 1) as well as of the three
aggregate indices we obtained with the principal component analysis presented in Appendix B.
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7 Additional Tests on the Exogeneity of Residential allocation in
the Public housing sector
7.1 Absence of self-sorting on ethnic backgrounds
Our first set of alternative tests consists in showing that while households tend to self-segregate in
the unconstrained private housing market, there is no such evidence in the public housing market.
We test this using the LFS and focusing on individuals who recently moved into an area (within the
previous year).
We first estimate the correlation between the hourly wages of the movers and the level of diversity
of the area into which they just moved. Without prior beliefs over agents’ preferences, if individuals
have a taste for or against homogeneity, there should be a significant relationship between the level of
ethnic diversity prevailing in their neighborhood and their wages when their choice is not constrained
by legal rules. Indeed, in an unconstrained market (e.g. the private housing market), the richer the
individual, the easier it should be for him or her to choose his or her neighborhood. Therefore,
if the level of diversity of the area enters one’s preferences, there should be a correlation between
individual wealth and the level of diversity in the area. In the public housing market as well, some
public housing units are more expensive than others, depending on the location and the date of
construction. The wealthiest inhabitants could thus have some control over the diversity of their
neighborhood, in theory.
To test this, we compute the fractionalization index of the area to which a household recently
moved taking into account only the neighbors who had been living there for more than one year.
We thus calculate the fractionalization indices at stake prior to the move. For the private housing
market, we compute the fractionalization index of the whole area, including both the population
living in private and public housing dwellings within this area. We follow this strategy since there
are a few areas with both public and private housing units in the LFS. It is reasonable to think that
it is the level of diversity of the whole neighborhood that will matter in the mobility decision in the
private market.32 Regarding the public housing sector, we compute the level of diversity including
residents of the public housing only, our identification assumption being that households do not have
control over the level of diversity of their neighborhood within the public housing sector.
We run OLS estimates of the hourly wage of newly arrived individuals on the level of diver-
sity of the area in which they just moved, controlling for the department of residence.33 First, we
focus on individuals having just moved into a private dwelling. We find a very strong negative
relationship between income and diversity (the estimated coefficient is -0.14 and is significant at the
1 percent level).34 Then we look at the sample of individuals having moved into a public housing
dwelling within the past year. In this case, the simple OLS regression reveals that there is no sig-
nificant correlation between the income of individuals moving into a public housing dwelling and
32The results are unchanged if we consider only the population living in the private housing sector: the magnitude
of the correlation decreases marginally, but remains statistically significant.
33If we reverse the dependent and the explanatory variables, the sign and significance level of the coefficient remains
the same.
34This is powerful evidence of the bias introduced with endogenous sorting
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pre-existing diversity of nationalities within the neighborhood.35 These correlations show that while
the wealthiest households tend to self-segregate in less diverse areas in the (unregulated) private
housing market, it does not seem to be the case in the (regulated) public housing market. In other
words, although diversity enters households’ preferences as revealed by the private housing market
result, the location in the public housing market seems to be unaffected by such preferences.
Our second test uses the same methodology and estimates the link between the origin (nation-
ality) of individuals moving into a new area and the share of the area’s "long term" population of
the same origin.36 We expect a significant relationship in the private housing market where loca-
tion choice is relatively unconstrained but not in the public housing sector. Table 15 reports the
results from an OLS regression of the share of neighbors from the same origin as new movers on
new movers’ characteristics: nationality group, public housing dummy, quadratic function of age,
hourly wage (log) education, socio-economic category, department fixed effects, and interaction of
individual characteristics with the public housing dummy. We consider seven different nationality
groups: native French, naturalized French, Europeans, Maghrebians, other Africans, Asians, and
other nationalities, which is taken as the reference group.
Three facts are worth noting here. First, there is indeed evidence that on average native French
are significantly more likely to move in neighborhoods where the share of natives is higher, compared
to households from other nationalities. This is not surprising given the fact that natives make up
a large majority in the French population. The second interesting point is that the coefficient for
living in the public housing sector is negative and significant at the 5% level. More precisely, it
reveals that HLM households move in areas where the share of individuals from the same origin is
on average 15.5% lower than for households in the private housing sector. This result strengthens
the idea that the extent to which households in the public housing sector live close to their co-ethnics
is lower than in the private sector. Finally, when we interact nationalities with the public housing
dummy, none of the coefficients but one are significant. This comforts us with the idea that there
is no particular self-segregation along ethnic lines in the public housing sector. The only coefficient
that is significant is for naturalized French individuals, which is not a clear ethnic group. However,
when we control for the share of one’s own ethnic group in one’s department in column (2)37, even
this interaction term turns insignificant.38
35The results are not displayed but are available upon request.
36A similar test was proposed by Goux and Maurin (2007) to show that the educational achievement of the children
of newcomers in public housing is uncorrelated with that of the current residents. Individuals do not self-select in
public housing neighborhoods according to the educational achievement of the neighbors’ children. By contrast, the
authors find a strong self-selection on the educational characteristics in the private housing sector.
37The purpose of including this variables is to account for the fact that part of the ethnic sorting is likely to be due
to an over-representation of some groups in given departments and in particular in the public housing sector.
38In a previous version of the paper, we regressed individuals’ origin on the share of the population of his or her
new neighborhood from each nationality in each housing sector, rather than pooling individuals from all origins. The
results were the following. In the private housing sector, a significant relationship between one’s nationality and the
share of same-origin neighbors showed up for most of the nationality groups. By contrast, in the public housing
sector, there was no statistically significant relationship between the nationality of the individual and the share of the
"long term" population in the area having the same nationality. The correlation was close to zero for households with
African origins, and was around three times as low as in the private sector for households with Maghrebian origins.
The only significant relationship showed up for immigrants from Europe, who represent a marginal share of the whole
immigrant population compared to immigrants from the Maghreb and Africa. However, because the standard errors
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We conduct the same kind of test on other individual characteristics, and reach similar con-
clusions. We find that in the private sector, highly educated (respectively low skilled) individuals
are very likely to move into neighborhoods with higher levels of highly educated (respectively low
skilled) people. This is not surprising and illustrates self segregation along education level in the
private sector. On the contrary, such segregation does not appear in the public housing sector. The
only characteristic for which we find a positive correlation between the new and the old inhabitants
in public housing blocks is the fact of being a factory worker. This is perhaps not too surprising
either given that factory workers represent more than 30 percent of the public housing population,
and due to the history of public housing, which was initially (and over several decades) dedicated
to factory workers.
We also regress the probability of having moved in a new HLM dwelling in the past year (dummy
equal to one in this case and to zero if the individual was already living in the same HLM apart-
ment one year before) on individual characteristics (nationality, age, gender, wage, education, socio
professional group), and the interaction of these characteristics with the ethnic diversity among the
public housing population of the block.39 As would be expected in the absence of sorting, the coef-
ficients on the interaction terms are not significantly different from zero. The only exception is for
the interaction of ELF with the dummy for African nationality, for which the coefficient is negative
and significant at the 10 percent level.
Finally, we build on the information about relationships provided by the Housing Survey to bring
additional evidence on the absence of sorting. More specifically, respondents to the HS are asked
the following questions. "How would you qualify the relationships with your close neighbors?" and
"How would you qualify the relationships in your neighborhood?", where the first question refers to
the direct neighborhood, while the second one refers to a larger neighborhood. The possible answers
are 1 for "Good", 2 for "Average", 3 for "Bad" and 4 for "No relationship". From this, we build two
dummy variables indicating whether the individual reports any relationship (good, average or bad)
in the direct or in the larger neighborhood, respectively. Simple descriptive statistics and correlations
reveal that living in the public housing sector is associated with a significantly higher probability to
have no relationship at all with your neighbors, the more so the larger the neighborhood considered.
However, when we control for neighborhood, households and building characteristics, there is no
significant difference between the private and the public housing sectors in terms of existence of
relationships. In addition, for individuals reporting having relationships, we built two variables
characterizing the quality of the relationship in the direct or in the larger neighborhood, respectively.
In this case, simple correlations reveal that individuals living in the public housing sector tend to
have worse relationship with their neighbors, if any. This relationship remains significant when we
control for neighborhood, households and building characteristics.40 To summarize, public housing
were quite large in the public housing sector due to a low number of observations, we decided to run this alternative
test with pooled data.
39The results are not displayed in the paper but are available from authors upon request.
40The precise figures corresponding to the previous results are not reported in the paper but are available from the
authors upon request.
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neighborhoods are characterized by an absence of any relationship, and by a decrease in the quality of
relationship when they exist. This brings additional support to our assumption that public housing
tenants do not choose their neighbors, otherwise we would expect them to report more frequent
relationship, of better quality.
7.2 Tests on the refusal rate of public housing offers
The previous tests point out the absence of self-selection along ethnic lines among the movers. But
self-selection could occur prior to the move. In this case the sample of movers that we observe in the
database would be biased. We address this issue by looking at households that have refused a public
housing dwelling offer. Actually, a disturbing fact for our assumption is that a non-negligible share
of households waiting to be allocated into a public housing unit report to have declined at least one
offer. In the Housing Survey, 24.2 percent of households currently living in a public housing dwelling
report to have rejected at least one proposal before finding their current place. Besides, 16.5 percent
of the households that are still waiting for an offer at the time of the survey - whether they are
already living in a public housing dwelling or not- have previously turned down at least one offer.
An additional concern is that 47.9 percent of the households in public housing that had declined an
offer at the time they were on the waiting list declared that one of the major reasons for this decision
was they found the local environment unpleasant.41 The corresponding figure for the households
still waiting for an answer amounts to 57 percent. The answer "unpleasant local environment" is
hard to interpret at this stage, since it could refer to diversity as well as the proximity to public
transport and infrastructure, lack of green spaces and so on.
Yet, we show that even if households declined at least one offer, possibly due to the ethnic di-
versity of the neighborhood, they were still unable to choose the level of diversity of the area in
wich they end up living, and would not be able to do so for any neighborhood to which they would
receive an allocation in the future. To put it another way, although households may have a distaste
for diversity, we find evidence that this is not taken into account in their allocation process by the
attribution commissions. In principle, households can decline up to three offers. But due to the
strong shortage of public housing dwellings, we find that households that have declined an offer in
the past cannot self-select into less diverse neighborhoods in the future. We provide evidence of that
fact in what follows.
First, if there were self-selection upon diversity, we should expect households that turned down
proposals before being allocated to their current public housing dwelling to end up living in less
diverse neighborhoods. To test this conjecture, we run OLS regressions of a variable indicating
whether the household declined at least one offer (during the latest application process) on the level
of diversity of the neighborhood in which it now lives.42 Panel A-I of Table 16 shows various estimates
of the effect of ethnic diversity on the probability of having turned down offers. Column 1 shows
the correlation without any additional control variables. In Column 2, we control for household
41The other possible answers were: inconvenient place, rent too expensive, low quality building, and apartment not
corresponding to household needs.
42In this paper, we always rely on OLS estimations, even when the dependent variables are dummies. Using probit
estimates does significantly affect our results.
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characteristics. We add up the characteristics of the housing project in Column 3. Column 4 finally
includes neighborhood characteristics and department fixed effects since the allocation of a public
housing dwelling takes place at the department level. In each specification, the coefficient on ELF
is not significantly different from zero, showing that households having declined offers during their
past allocation process do not end up living in neighborhoods with significantly different levels of
diversity.
We explore further the validity of this conjecture by focusing on the reasons adumbrated by
households for refusing an offer. If public housing residents were to sort themselves on the basis of
their (dis)taste for diversity, those who declined "because of the local environment" should now live
in significantly less diverse neighborhoods. We thus regress a dummy variable indicating whether an
"unpleasant environment" was the reason why the household declined at least one offer (during the
past application process) on the level of diversity of its current neighborhood. Panel A-II of Table
16 reports the estimates on the level of diversity, using the same specifications as above. Here again,
none of the coefficients is significant. Instead, household characteristics such as the labor market
status of the head of household and the size of the household are the only ones that matter in these
regressions.
Alternatively, we perform these tests on the subsample of individuals currently waiting for an
HLM offer. Panel B of Table 16 shows the regressions of the refusal dummy (B-I) and the "refusal
due to unpleasant environment" dummy (B-II), for individuals who are currently applying for public
housing on the diversity in their neighborhood. We still control for household, building and neigh-
borhood characteristics. Once again, we find that the ethnic diversity of a block is uncorrelated
with households wait-listed for an HLM assignment having turned down offers since the beginning
of their request (B-I). This suggests that the current level of diversity in the block does not rush
households out of the area, as their propensity to decline an offer is independent of the ELF in the
current neighborhood. The high refusal rates of HLM offers do not therefore seem driven by a hope
to reduce diversity by waiting.
Let us now focus on individuals who left their previous housing unit because they did not like the
environment. In the Housing Survey, 5 percent of households that moved over the past four years
mention an unpleasant environment as one of the main reason they moved. In this question, the
phrase "unpleasant environment" explicitly refers to troubles such as "noise, lifestyle or insecurity".
Again, this could be related to high levels of diversity. If this is true, and if households can actually
select the block to which they move, then we expect that those households having moved because
they disliked their environment ended up living in less diverse neighborhoods than the households
that moved for a different reason.
We perform OLS regressions of a variable indicating whether the household left its previous
housing due to an unpleasant environment, on the level of diversity of its current neighborhood.
Table 17 shows the coefficients on diversity in the specification controlling for household, building
and neighborhood characteristics, and including department fixed effects. Column 1 shows the
results for households that moved within the private housing market. As expected, households that
left their previous housing to escape from an unpleasant environment now live in blocks where the
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diversity is significantly lower. Column 2 shows that this result does not hold for households that
moved within the public housing market. This result suggests once again that in the public housing
sector, households do not have control over the diversity of the block to which they are allocated.
A potential concern with the previous result is due to the small sample of observations (only 627
in the public housing case), generating large standard errors. Therefore, we replicate this test on a
larger subsample. Instead of focusing on households that have moved within a housing sector, we
now concentrate on households having moved into each sector, no matter the sector in which they
were living prior to their move.43 As previously, we see that for households living in the private
housing sector, the probability that they left their previous housing due to an unpleasant environ-
ment is negatively correlated with the diversity in the current neighborhood (Column 3). However,
no such significant relationship shows up for households living in a public housing dwelling (Column
4), and the estimates are now more precise than in Column 2. We can infer from those tests that
households tend to self-select in low-diversity neighborhoods in the private housing sector, but are
unable to do so in the public housing sector.
8 Conclusion
This paper exploits French public housing policy as a natural experiment to identify the causal effect
of diversity on well-being, social relationships and the quality of local public goods. The French
Housing Survey provides a unique micro level of analysis of social interaction between adjacent
neighbors within housing blocks. We provide a detailed analysis of the channels through which
diversity operates at the local level while the previous literature focused so far on aggregate outcomes
and channels. We use the exogenous allocation of households within public housing with respect to
ethnic characteristics in France to address the bias from endogenous residential sorting that reduces
the confidence in previous empirical findings on fractionalization. We find that fractionalization has
a negative impact on other-regarding preferences, leading to higher neglect and vandalism in the
housing commons. Fractionalization also undermines collective action for the improvement of the
quality of housing. But in our context, fractionalization has no effect on public safety, diversity
being associated with social anomie within the housing blocks rather than violent confrontations
among neighbors.
This natural experiment calls for future research on the specific role of national, local and informal
institutions in mitigating or magnifying the effect of ethnic diversity on the provision of public goods.
France is a country with a republican tradition that resolutely refuses to reify ethnic identification
as a strategy to prevent the ethnification of everyday life. Yet we find a significant negative effect
of diversity on local public goods in its public housing sector, comparable to the association found
in the US localities where multiculturalist institutions regulate ethnic relations (Putnam, 2007) and
in cases where public institutions are weak (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005). However, on issues of
physical security in French public housing, the costs to ethnic diversity disappear. This may be due
43To summarize, Columns 1 and 2 report the results for households moving from a housing dwelling in the private (1)
and public (2) sectors into a housing dwelling in the same sectors. Columns 3 and 4 report the results for households
moving from any housing sector into the private (3) and public (4) sectors.
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to the emergence of informal institutions (such as in-group policing as in Fearon and Laitin, 1996)
or the supremacy of state-level institutions in which local diversity plays no role in the supply of
order. In any event, the results raise a puzzle, to be addressed in future research, on the general
power of institutional arguments in overcoming the negative implications of ethnic heterogeneity on
the provision of public goods.
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Table 1: Public Housing and Private Housing population characteristics (households heads, Housing
Survey 2002)
Public Housing Private Housing p-val Private Rental p-val
(HLM) (1)/(2) Housing market (1)/(4)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Birth Country
France 78.63 88.34 0.000 86.16 0.000
Portugal 1.72 1.23 0.028 1.05 0.004
Spain 1.12 0.78 0.089 0.68 0.033
Italy 0.72 1.10 0.007 0.51 0.210
Other E.U. country 0.71 1.05 0.091 1.11 0.086
Turkey 1.24 0.30 0.000 0.51 0.000
Other European country 0.74 0.75 0.767 0.89 0.457
Maghreb 11.06 4.14 0.000 5.00 0.000
Other African country 2.66 1.06 0.000 2.17 0.327
Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos 0.69 0.41 0.016 0.51 0.227
Other countries 0.72 0.84 0.381 1.40 0.001
Nationality
French at birth 82.07 91.53 0.000 88.98 0.000
French by acquisition 5.81 3.72 0.000 3.47 0.000
Portuguese 1.33 1.00 0.090 1.02 0.202
Spanish 0.62 0.31 0.004 0.44 0.265
Italian 0.47 0.43 0.865 0.20 0.012
Other E.U. nationality 0.21 0.63 0.002 0.68 0.00
Turkish 1.01 0.19 0.000 0.41 0.000
Other European nationality 0.33 0.32 0.959 0.53 0.157
Maghrebian 6.34 1.02 0.000 2.10 0.000
Other African nationality 1.50 0.38 0.000 1.03 0.096
Cambodian, Vietnamese, Laotian 0.17 0.07 0.004 0.14 0.354
Other nationalities 0.14 0.40 0.016 0.99 0.000
Employment status
Employed 58.19 56.11 0.090 63.74 0.000
Unemployed 10.82 4.08 0.000 7.75 0.000
Inactive 30.99 39.81 0.000 28.51 0.004
Level of education (highest diploma obtained, individuals above 25 years old)
No diploma 28.26 14.85 0.000 14.40 0.000
Lower education 50.62 48.33 0.009 37.38 0.000
Baccalaureate 9.37 12.44 0.000 16.26 0.000
Higher education 11.74 24.38 0.000 31.96 0.000
Socio professional group
Farmer 0.18 1.96 0.000 0.67 0.000
Craftsman, Shopkeeper 1.50 5.03 0.000 3.99 0.000
Executive or other high position 3.64 13.03 0.000 14.14 0.000
Intermediate occupation 12.01 14.29 0.000 16.50 0.000
Employee 20.18 9.93 0.000 15.44 0.000
(Factory) Worker 31.10 16.02 0.000 20.35 0.000
Age (mean) 47.09 51.71 0.000 41.55 0.000
Annual income (mean) 12,226 18,041 0.000 15,902 0.000
Column 3 reports the p-value from a t-test for the null hypothesis that the mean of a given variable is the
same for the public housing (Column 1) and private housing (Column 2) populations. Column 5 reports the
p-value from a t-test for the null hypothesis that the mean of a given variable is the same for the public
housing population (Column 1) and for the population of tenants in the private housing market (Column 4).
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Table 2: Dissatisfaction with housing conditions by income level and ethnic origin in the Public
Housing sector
Dissatisfaction with Housing Conditions Mean Annual
Very Satisfying Average Insufficient Very Income
satisfying insufficient (in euros)
Ethnic origin
French born 13.8 44.01 28.54 9.9 3.75 12,758
Naturalized French 10.68 43.51 29.01 13.8 2.99 10,459
Other European 10.71 39.58 31.21 13.14 5.35 12,292
Maghrebian 8.42 33.27 34.83 18.21 5.26 8,603
African 7.82 20.77 41.29 25.14 4.99 7,865
Asian 0.00 60.64 11.25 28.11 0.00 12,892
Mean Annual Income 13,300 12,856 11,842 10,288 10,127
Table 3: Equality of distribution between the actual and simulated distributions of ethnic groups
shares across public housing blocks: percentage of departments where equality is not rejected.
t-tests K.S-test
Native French 100% 98.61%
Maghrebi 100% 98.01%
Both groups 100% 97.22%
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Table 4: Ethnic diversity and dissatisfaction with housing condition
Dependent Variable: Dissatisfaction with housing condition
Coefficient (Std error)
Ethnic Diversity 0.368** (0.129)
Household characteristics:
Gender -0.018 (0.032)
Age -0.005*** (0.001)
Level of Education -0.013* (0.007)
Income (log) -0.043 (0.031)
Household size 0.105*** (0.013)
Employment status (ref: Employed)
Unemployed 0.056 (0.055)
Inactive -0.049 (0.047)
Nationality (ref: French at birth)
Naturalized French -0.047 (0.066)
European 0.040 (0.089)
Maghrebian -0.097 (0.067)
African 0.109 (0.143)
Asian -0.623** (0.311)
Other nationality 0.557 (0.633)
Building characteristics:
Nb of dwellings (log) 0.020 (0.013)
Date of construction of the building (ref: before 1948)
1949 ≤ t < 1974 0.017 (0.077)
1975 ≤ t < 1981 -0.094 (0.081)
1982 ≤ t < 1989 -0.109 (0.082)
1990 ≤ t < 1998 -0.423*** (0.085)
1999 ≤ t -0.751*** (0.166)
Neighborhood characteristics:
Block unemployment rate 1.003*** (0.176)
Socio-economic background (Tabard) Yes
Department Fixed Effects Yes
Intercept 4.377*** (0.394)
R-squared 0.128
Observations 4379
Robust standard errors adjusted for block clustering are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5: Descriptive statistics for each outcome in the public housing sector
Mean std dev Values
1. Degradation of the common areas due to vandalism
Damaging the premises 1.637 0.778 1 - 3
Graffiti 0.257 0.437 0 - 1
Garbage on the floor 0.188 0.391 0 - 1
Broken windows 0.136 0.343 0 - 1
Broken doors 0.127 0.333 0 - 1
Broken light bulbs 0.094 0.291 0 - 1
Broken mailboxes 0.154 0.361 0 - 1
Vandalism on the elevator 0.085 0.279 0 - 1
Noise in daytime 1.595 0.748 1 - 3
Noise in night time 1.374 0.627 1 - 3
2. Poor quality of housing due to low maintenance
Care of the common areas 1.593 0.752 1 - 3
Condition of the outside walls 2.433 0.962 1 - 5
Cold in the apartment 0.175 0.380 0 - 1
Cold due to bad insulation 0.065 0.246 0 - 1
Cold due to breakdown in heating equipment 0.045 0.207 0 - 1
Cold due to poor equipment 0.059 0.236 0 - 1
Quality of soundproofing 1.981 0.823 1 - 3
Breakdown of the elevator 0.155 0.362 0 - 1
Toilet malfunction 0.153 0.360 0 - 1
3. Public Safety
Robberies 0.095 0.293 0 - 1
Aggressions 0.081 0.273 0 - 1
Burglary (or attempt) 0.041 0.198 0 - 1
Depending on the questions, we have between 4,310 and 5,189 observations
33
T
ab
le
6:
D
iv
er
si
ty
an
d
P
ub
lic
go
od
s:
D
eg
ra
da
ti
on
of
th
e
co
m
m
on
ar
ea
s
du
e
to
va
nd
al
is
m
(T
o
be
co
nt
in
ue
d)
O
ut
co
m
es
:
D
am
ag
in
g
G
ra
ffi
ti
G
ar
ba
ge
B
ro
ke
n
B
ro
ke
n
B
ro
ke
n
B
ro
ke
n
V
an
da
lis
m
on
N
oi
se
in
N
oi
se
in
th
e
pr
em
is
es
on
th
e
flo
or
w
in
do
w
s
do
or
s
lig
ht
bu
lb
s
m
ai
lb
ox
es
th
e
el
ev
at
or
da
yt
im
e
N
ig
ht
im
e
E
th
n
ic
D
iv
er
si
ty
0.
63
0*
**
0.
31
3*
**
0.
29
8*
**
0.
20
0*
**
0.
15
1*
*
0.
27
1*
**
0.
33
0*
**
0.
16
8*
**
0.
28
8*
*
0.
31
3*
**
(0
.1
27
)
(0
.0
63
)
(0
.0
60
)
(0
.0
53
)
(0
.0
51
)
(0
.0
48
)
(0
.0
58
)
(0
.0
47
)
(0
.1
06
)
(0
.0
91
)
H
ou
se
h
ol
d
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s:
G
en
de
r
0.
00
6
0.
00
6
0.
00
3
0.
00
4
0.
00
7
0.
01
2
0.
00
4
0.
01
6*
-0
.0
57
**
-0
.0
18
(0
.0
28
)
(0
.0
15
)
(0
.0
13
)
(0
.0
11
)
(0
.0
12
)
(0
.0
10
)
(0
.0
12
)
(0
.0
10
)
(0
.0
26
)
(0
.0
22
)
A
ge
-0
.0
00
-0
.0
00
-0
.0
00
-0
.0
00
-0
.0
00
-0
.0
00
-0
.0
01
**
0.
00
0
-0
.0
05
**
*
-0
.0
04
**
*
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
01
)
Le
ve
lo
f
E
du
ca
ti
on
-0
.0
01
-0
.0
04
0.
00
4
-0
.0
01
-0
.0
03
-0
.0
00
-0
.0
09
**
*
-0
.0
02
-0
.0
08
-0
.0
14
**
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
05
)
In
co
m
e
(l
og
)
0.
00
2
-0
.0
14
0.
00
3
0.
00
0
-0
.0
18
-0
.0
06
-0
.0
05
-0
.0
08
-0
.0
11
-0
.0
34
(0
.0
28
)
(0
.0
15
)
(0
.0
14
)
(0
.0
12
)
(0
.0
12
)
(0
.0
10
)
(0
.0
12
)
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
26
)
(0
.0
21
)
H
ou
se
ho
ld
si
ze
0.
04
4*
**
0.
01
5*
*
0.
00
6
0.
01
3*
*
0.
00
9*
*
0.
01
8*
**
0.
01
4*
*
0.
00
5
0.
03
1*
**
0.
01
6*
*
(0
.0
10
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
08
)
E
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
st
at
us
(r
ef
:
E
m
pl
oy
ed
)
U
ne
m
pl
oy
ed
0.
04
7
0.
01
7
0.
01
2
0.
02
1
-0
.0
09
-0
.0
13
0.
00
1
-0
.0
11
-0
.0
43
-0
.0
23
(0
.0
45
)
(0
.0
23
)
(0
.0
21
)
(0
.0
20
)
(0
.0
19
)
(0
.0
16
)
(0
.0
20
)
(0
.0
15
)
(0
.0
39
)
(0
.0
34
)
In
ac
ti
ve
-0
.0
44
-0
.0
31
-0
.0
20
-0
.0
11
-0
.0
28
*
0.
01
2
0.
01
3
-0
.0
22
*
0.
04
3
0.
04
7
(0
.0
39
)
(0
.0
20
)
(0
.0
18
)
(0
.0
17
)
(0
.0
17
)
(0
.0
15
)
(0
.0
18
)
(0
.0
13
)
(0
.0
37
)
(0
.0
32
)
N
at
io
na
lit
y
(r
ef
:
Fr
en
ch
at
bi
rt
h)
N
at
ur
al
iz
ed
Fr
en
ch
-0
.0
88
-0
.0
26
-0
.0
37
0.
00
7
0.
00
1
-0
.0
01
0.
00
9
0.
01
2
-0
.0
19
-0
.0
51
(0
.0
57
)
(0
.0
30
)
(0
.0
26
)
(0
.0
27
)
(0
.0
24
)
(0
.0
22
)
(0
.0
27
)
(0
.0
24
)
(0
.0
55
)
(0
.0
44
)
E
ur
op
ea
n
0.
00
3
-0
.0
49
-0
.0
27
0.
06
0*
0.
03
2
-0
.0
09
0.
04
1
-0
.0
37
-0
.0
24
0.
07
8
(0
.0
78
)
(0
.0
39
)
(0
.0
35
)
(0
.0
35
)
(0
.0
37
)
(0
.0
29
)
(0
.0
37
)
(0
.0
24
)
(0
.0
65
)
(0
.0
63
)
M
ag
hr
eb
ia
n
-0
.1
79
**
*
-0
.0
54
*
-0
.0
72
**
-0
.0
48
**
-0
.0
58
**
-0
.0
62
**
-0
.0
57
**
-0
.0
63
**
-0
.0
73
-0
.0
76
*
(0
.0
54
)
(0
.0
30
)
(0
.0
26
)
(0
.0
24
)
(0
.0
25
)
(0
.0
22
)
(0
.0
27
)
(0
.0
19
)
(0
.0
49
)
(0
.0
43
)
A
fr
ic
an
0.
01
9
-0
.0
63
-0
.0
41
-0
.0
27
0.
03
7
-0
.0
27
-0
.0
29
0.
00
6
0.
10
2
0.
05
6
(0
.1
12
)
(0
.0
64
)
(0
.0
59
)
(0
.0
54
)
(0
.0
59
)
(0
.0
52
)
(0
.0
57
)
(0
.0
51
)
(0
.1
00
)
(0
.0
90
)
A
si
an
-0
.1
11
-0
.0
09
-0
.2
58
**
0.
22
8
0.
00
2
0.
02
5
0.
13
4
0.
30
5*
0.
07
0
0.
10
7
(0
.2
31
)
(0
.1
56
)
(0
.1
21
)
(0
.1
56
)
(0
.1
48
)
(0
.1
58
)
(0
.1
51
)
(0
.1
67
)
(0
.2
31
)
(0
.1
94
)
O
th
er
na
ti
on
al
it
y
-0
.3
11
-0
.3
38
**
*
-0
.2
35
**
0.
02
3
0.
02
7
0.
09
3
0.
03
9
-0
.0
86
**
0.
23
3
0.
55
2
(0
.3
06
)
(0
.0
73
)
(0
.0
84
)
(0
.1
52
)
(0
.1
61
)
(0
.1
58
)
(0
.1
55
)
(0
.0
39
)
(0
.3
06
)
(0
.3
91
)
R
ob
us
t
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
ad
ju
st
ed
fo
r
bl
oc
k
cl
us
te
ri
ng
ar
e
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s.
**
*
p<
0.
01
,*
*
p<
0.
05
,*
p<
0.
1
34
T
ab
le
6:
D
iv
er
si
ty
an
d
P
ub
lic
go
od
s:
D
eg
ra
da
ti
on
of
th
e
co
m
m
on
ar
ea
s
du
e
to
va
nd
al
is
m
(C
on
ti
nu
ed
)
O
ut
co
m
es
:
D
am
ag
in
g
G
ra
ffi
ti
G
ar
ba
ge
B
ro
ke
n
B
ro
ke
n
B
ro
ke
n
B
ro
ke
n
V
an
da
lis
m
on
N
oi
se
in
N
oi
se
in
th
e
pr
em
is
es
on
th
e
flo
or
w
in
do
w
s
do
or
s
lig
ht
bu
lb
s
m
ai
lb
ox
es
th
e
el
ev
at
or
da
yt
im
e
N
ig
ht
im
e
B
u
il
d
in
g
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s:
N
b
of
dw
el
lin
gs
(l
og
)
0.
10
5*
**
0.
06
8*
**
0.
05
5*
**
0.
03
6*
**
0.
03
7*
**
0.
02
9*
**
0.
04
7*
**
0.
04
0*
**
.0
27
**
0.
02
5*
*
(0
.0
18
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
10
)
(0
.0
08
)
D
at
e
of
co
ns
tr
uc
ti
on
of
th
e
bu
ild
in
g
(r
ef
:
be
fo
re
19
48
)
19
49
≤
t
<
19
74
0.
25
3*
**
0.
11
5*
**
0.
08
1*
**
0.
05
4*
*
0.
05
8*
*
0.
01
7
0.
04
7*
*
0.
02
3
0.
04
1
-0
.0
24
(0
.0
61
)
(0
.0
25
)
(0
.0
22
)
(0
.0
20
)
(0
.0
21
)
(0
.0
15
)
(0
.0
20
)
(0
.0
17
)
(0
.0
59
)
(0
.0
51
)
19
75
≤
t
<
19
81
0.
27
7*
**
0.
11
8*
**
0.
08
8*
**
0.
05
3*
*
0.
04
9*
*
0.
03
4*
0.
04
3*
*
0.
03
8*
*
-0
.0
79
-0
.0
59
(0
.0
70
)
(0
.0
28
)
(0
.0
26
)
(0
.0
23
)
(0
.0
24
)
(0
.0
18
)
(0
.0
22
)
(0
.0
19
)
(0
.0
62
)
(0
.0
53
)
19
82
≤
t
<
19
89
0.
35
7*
**
0.
13
4*
**
0.
08
1*
*
0.
06
0*
*
0.
06
1*
*
0.
05
1*
*
0.
08
7*
**
0.
05
3*
*
-0
.1
06
*
-0
.0
48
(0
.0
73
)
(0
.0
29
)
(0
.0
26
)
(0
.0
23
)
(0
.0
25
)
(0
.0
20
)
(0
.0
24
)
(0
.0
21
)
(0
.0
63
)
(0
.0
55
)
19
90
≤
t
<
19
98
0.
26
1*
**
0.
09
3*
**
0.
06
6*
*
0.
03
8*
0.
04
7*
*
0.
00
9
0.
04
9*
*
0.
02
5
-0
.1
71
**
-0
.1
05
*
(0
.0
71
)
(0
.0
27
)
(0
.0
25
)
(0
.0
21
)
(0
.0
23
)
(0
.0
17
)
(0
.0
21
)
(0
.0
18
)
(0
.0
63
)
(0
.0
55
)
19
99
≤
t
0.
21
0
0.
07
3
0.
03
9
0.
11
3
0.
07
1
-0
.0
37
-0
.0
39
-0
.0
34
-0
.3
21
**
-0
.3
41
**
*
(0
.1
54
)
(0
.0
67
)
(0
.0
75
)
(0
.0
82
)
(0
.0
67
)
(0
.0
28
)
(0
.0
34
)
(0
.0
30
)
(0
.1
40
)
(0
.0
66
)
N
ei
gh
b
or
h
oo
d
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s:
B
lo
ck
un
em
pl
.
ra
te
1.
06
3*
**
0.
35
1*
**
0.
41
5*
**
0.
20
7*
**
0.
23
0*
**
0.
26
3*
**
0.
29
4*
**
0.
10
0*
0.
47
8*
**
0.
41
4*
**
(0
.1
66
)
(0
.0
68
)
(0
.0
72
)
(0
.0
58
)
(0
.0
55
)
(0
.0
45
)
(0
.0
63
)
(0
.0
56
)
(0
.1
29
)
(0
.1
12
)
So
ci
o-
ec
on
om
ic
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
ba
ck
gr
ou
nd
(T
ab
ar
d)
D
ep
ar
tm
en
t
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
F
ix
ed
E
ffe
ct
s
In
te
rc
ep
t
0.
58
8*
*
-0
.0
34
-0
.1
86
-0
.1
32
0.
08
5
-0
.0
95
-0
.0
96
-0
.1
00
1
.8
99
**
*
1.
85
2*
**
(0
.2
98
)
(0
.1
55
)
(0
.1
40
)
(0
.1
26
)
(0
.1
28
)
(0
.1
05
)
(0
.1
28
)
(0
.0
93
)
(0
.
26
9)
(0
.2
22
)
R
-s
qu
ar
ed
0.
13
6
0.
15
7
0.
13
4
0.
09
1
0.
07
2
0.
08
6
0.
12
9
0.
09
3
0.
09
1
0.
08
1
O
bs
er
va
ti
on
s
36
61
43
79
43
79
43
79
43
79
43
79
43
79
43
79
43
79
43
79
E
ac
h
co
lu
m
n
co
rr
es
po
nd
s
to
a
di
ffe
re
nt
re
gr
es
si
on
,
fo
r
ea
ch
de
pe
nd
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
,
as
re
po
rt
ed
in
th
e
fir
st
lin
e.
R
ob
us
t
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
ad
ju
st
ed
fo
r
bl
oc
k
cl
us
te
ri
ng
ar
e
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s.
**
*
p<
0.
01
,*
*
p<
0.
05
,*
p<
0.
1
35
T
ab
le
7:
D
iv
er
si
ty
an
d
P
ub
lic
go
od
s:
P
oo
r
Q
ua
lit
y
of
H
ou
si
ng
du
e
to
lo
w
M
ai
nt
en
an
ce
(T
o
be
co
nt
in
ue
d)
O
ut
co
m
es
:
C
ar
e
C
on
di
ti
on
C
ol
d
C
ol
d
C
ol
d
du
e
to
C
ol
d
du
e
to
Q
ua
lit
y
B
re
ak
do
w
n
T
oi
le
t
of
th
e
of
th
e
in
th
e
du
e
to
br
ea
kd
ow
n
of
po
or
of
of
th
e
m
al
fu
nc
ti
on
co
m
m
on
ou
ts
id
e
ap
ar
tm
en
t
ba
d
he
at
in
g
he
at
in
g
so
un
dp
ro
ofi
ng
el
ev
at
or
ar
ea
s
w
al
ls
in
su
la
ti
on
eq
ui
pm
en
t
eq
ui
pm
en
t
E
th
n
ic
D
iv
er
si
ty
0.
38
4*
*
0.
26
0*
0.
13
6*
*
0.
02
1
0.
00
7
0.
08
4*
*
0.
02
1
0.
10
6*
*
0.
13
3*
*
(0
.1
21
)
(0
.1
45
)
(0
.0
59
)
(0
.0
40
)
(0
.0
37
)
(0
.0
36
)
(0
.1
10
)
(0
.0
51
)
(0
.0
51
)
H
ou
se
h
ol
d
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s:
G
en
de
r
-0
.0
27
-0
.0
30
-0
.0
29
**
-0
.0
13
-0
.0
19
**
-0
.0
22
**
-0
.0
09
-0
.0
02
-0
.0
17
(0
.0
28
)
(0
.0
32
)
(0
.0
14
)
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
08
)
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
28
)
(0
.0
12
)
(0
.0
13
)
A
ge
-0
.0
03
**
-0
.0
03
**
-0
.0
00
-0
.0
00
-0
.0
00
-0
.0
00
-0
.0
06
**
*
0.
00
1*
-0
.0
01
**
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
Le
ve
lo
f
E
du
ca
ti
on
-0
.0
00
-0
.0
10
-0
.0
00
-0
.0
00
0.
00
1
-0
.0
01
-0
.0
07
-0
.0
00
0.
00
1
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
07
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
03
)
In
co
m
e
(l
og
)
0.
05
1*
0.
02
4
-0
.0
09
-0
.0
04
0.
00
9
-0
.0
10
0.
00
4
0.
01
1
-0
.0
22
(0
.0
29
)
(0
.0
32
)
(0
.0
14
)
(0
.0
08
)
(0
.0
08
)
(0
.0
08
)
(0
.0
29
)
(0
.0
12
)
(0
.0
13
)
H
ou
se
ho
ld
si
ze
0.
05
1*
**
0.
04
1*
**
0.
01
3*
*
0.
00
9*
*
0.
00
4
0.
00
6*
0.
02
7*
*
0.
01
3*
*
0.
02
0*
**
(0
.0
11
)
(0
.0
11
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
10
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
05
)
E
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
st
at
us
(r
ef
:
E
m
pl
oy
ed
)
U
ne
m
pl
oy
ed
0.
04
1
-0
.0
30
0.
00
8
0.
00
6
-0
.0
03
0.
01
2
-0
.0
19
0.
00
0
0.
02
1
(0
.0
44
)
(0
.0
49
)
(0
.0
22
)
(0
.0
14
)
(0
.0
11
)
(0
.0
15
)
(0
.0
42
)
(0
.0
19
)
(0
.0
21
)
In
ac
ti
ve
0.
02
6
0.
02
6
-0
.0
15
0.
00
5
-0
.0
01
-0
.0
04
-0
.0
11
-0
.0
14
0.
00
4
(0
.0
39
)
(0
.0
43
)
(0
.0
19
)
(0
.0
13
)
(0
.0
10
)
(0
.0
12
)
(0
.0
38
)
(0
.0
16
)
(0
.0
19
)
N
at
io
na
lit
y
(r
ef
:
Fr
en
ch
at
bi
rt
h)
N
at
ur
al
iz
ed
Fr
en
ch
-0
.0
60
-0
.0
75
0.
04
6
0.
01
0
0.
01
6
0.
02
0
-0
.0
27
-0
.0
47
**
-0
.0
33
(0
.0
56
)
(0
.0
59
)
(0
.0
29
)
(0
.0
18
)
(0
.0
17
)
(0
.0
20
)
(0
.0
60
)
(0
.0
23
)
(0
.0
25
)
E
ur
op
ea
n
0.
15
5*
*
-0
.0
94
-0
.0
22
0.
00
7
-0
.0
02
0.
00
6
0.
03
7
-0
.0
26
-0
.0
21
(0
.0
79
)
(0
.0
87
)
(0
.0
36
)
(0
.0
25
)
(0
.0
20
)
(0
.0
24
)
(0
.0
72
)
(0
.0
34
)
(0
.0
33
)
M
ag
hr
eb
ia
n
-0
.0
80
-0
.2
47
**
*
0.
06
8*
*
0.
00
2
0.
01
6
0.
05
1*
*
-0
.1
70
**
0.
00
2
-0
.0
61
**
(0
.0
54
)
(0
.0
61
)
(0
.0
29
)
(0
.0
20
)
(0
.0
16
)
(0
.0
21
)
(0
.0
52
)
(0
.0
25
)
(0
.0
25
)
A
fr
ic
an
0.
12
2
-0
.0
33
0.
17
1*
*
-0
.0
01
0.
05
5
0.
03
5
0.
06
8
0.
01
6
0.
07
1
(0
.1
01
)
(0
.1
16
)
(0
.0
63
)
(0
.0
40
)
(0
.0
38
)
(0
.0
43
)
(0
.0
94
)
(0
.0
56
)
(0
.0
59
)
A
si
an
0.
16
2
0.
03
3
-0
.2
41
**
*
-0
.1
04
**
*
-0
.0
72
**
*
-0
.0
94
**
*
0.
17
2
0.
08
8
0.
05
7
(0
.3
43
)
(0
.3
01
)
(0
.0
33
)
(0
.0
21
)
(0
.0
21
)
(0
.0
20
)
(0
.2
23
)
(0
.1
47
)
(0
.1
43
)
O
th
er
na
ti
on
al
it
y
0.
17
7
0.
48
7
-0
.1
64
**
*
-0
.0
82
**
*
-0
.0
30
-0
.0
50
**
0.
03
8
-0
.1
43
**
0.
10
4
(0
.3
29
)
(0
.3
93
)
(0
.0
41
)
(0
.0
22
)
(0
.0
27
)
(0
.0
18
)
(0
.4
40
)
(0
.0
60
)
(0
.1
85
)
R
ob
us
t
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
ad
ju
st
ed
fo
r
bl
oc
k
cl
us
te
ri
ng
ar
e
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s.
**
*
p<
0.
01
,*
*
p<
0.
05
,*
p<
0.
1
36
T
ab
le
7:
D
iv
er
si
ty
an
d
P
ub
lic
go
od
s:
P
oo
r
Q
ua
lit
y
of
H
ou
si
ng
du
e
to
lo
w
M
ai
nt
en
an
ce
(C
on
ti
nu
ed
)
O
ut
co
m
es
:
C
ar
e
C
on
di
ti
on
C
ol
d
C
ol
d
C
ol
d
du
e
to
C
ol
d
du
e
to
Q
ua
lit
y
B
re
ak
do
w
n
T
oi
le
t
of
th
e
of
th
e
in
th
e
du
e
to
br
ea
kd
ow
n
of
po
or
of
of
th
e
m
al
fu
nc
ti
on
co
m
m
on
ou
ts
id
e
ap
ar
tm
en
t
ba
d
he
at
in
g
he
at
in
g
so
un
dp
ro
ofi
ng
el
ev
at
or
ar
ea
s
w
al
ls
in
su
la
ti
on
eq
ui
pm
en
t
eq
ui
pm
en
t
B
u
il
d
in
g
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s:
N
b
of
dw
el
lin
gs
(l
og
)
-0
.0
26
-0
.0
25
*
0.
00
3
0.
00
1
-0
.0
00
-0
.0
01
0.
04
2*
**
0.
06
9*
**
-0
.0
07
(0
.0
16
)
(0
.0
15
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
11
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
05
)
D
at
e
of
co
ns
tr
uc
ti
on
of
th
e
bu
ild
in
g
(r
ef
:
be
fo
re
19
48
)
19
49
≤
t
<
19
74
0.
04
9
0.
04
1
0.
01
7
-0
.0
03
0.
00
4
0.
02
9*
*
-0
.0
04
0.
02
8
-0
.0
04
(0
.0
70
)
(0
.0
77
)
(0
.0
27
)
(0
.0
19
)
(0
.0
16
)
(0
.0
14
)
(0
.0
63
)
(0
.0
22
)
(0
.0
27
)
19
75
≤
t
<
19
81
-0
.0
05
0.
13
8*
0.
04
6
0.
01
3
0.
00
6
0.
03
6*
*
-0
.1
61
**
0.
09
7*
**
0.
00
7
(0
.0
75
)
(0
.0
81
)
(0
.0
29
)
(0
.0
20
)
(0
.0
17
)
(0
.0
16
)
(0
.0
68
)
(0
.0
25
)
(0
.0
29
)
19
82
≤
t
<
19
89
0.
03
0
0.
04
8
0.
00
4
-0
.0
11
0.
00
2
0.
02
2
-0
.3
88
**
*
0.
06
1*
*
-0
.0
50
*
(0
.0
79
)
(0
.0
84
)
(0
.0
30
)
(0
.0
21
)
(0
.0
18
)
(0
.0
16
)
(0
.0
67
)
(0
.0
26
)
(0
.0
30
)
19
90
≤
t
<
19
98
-0
.0
55
-0
.4
39
**
*
-0
.0
50
*
-0
.0
41
**
-0
.0
01
-0
.0
03
-0
.5
74
**
*
0.
04
6*
-0
.0
89
**
(0
.0
80
)
(0
.0
82
)
(0
.0
29
)
(0
.0
20
)
(0
.0
18
)
(0
.0
14
)
(0
.0
68
)
(0
.0
26
)
(0
.0
30
)
19
99
≤
t
0.
03
9
-1
.0
55
**
*
-0
.0
78
-0
.0
71
**
0.
02
6
-0
.0
09
-0
.8
49
**
*
-0
.0
81
**
-0
.0
09
(0
.1
62
)
(0
.1
52
)
(0
.0
57
)
(0
.0
24
)
(0
.0
49
)
(0
.0
20
)
(0
.1
50
)
(0
.0
39
)
(0
.0
94
)
N
ei
gh
b
or
h
oo
d
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s:
B
lo
ck
un
em
pl
.
ra
te
1.
04
4*
**
0.
82
7*
**
0.
21
6*
**
0.
10
4*
*
0.
05
4
0.
06
3*
0.
64
1*
**
0.
07
4
0.
08
4
(0
.1
58
)
(0
.1
66
)
(0
.0
65
)
(0
.0
42
)
(0
.0
46
)
(0
.0
38
)
(0
.1
26
)
(0
.0
57
)
(0
.0
60
)
So
ci
o-
ec
on
om
ic
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
ba
ck
gr
ou
nd
(T
ab
ar
d)
D
ep
ar
tm
en
t
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
F
ix
ed
E
ffe
ct
s
In
te
rc
ep
t
0.
81
2*
*
2.
32
1*
**
0.
22
6
0.
04
7
0.
03
3
0.
07
4
1.
93
9*
**
-0
.3
12
**
0.
33
2*
*
(0
.2
96
)
(0
.3
30
)
(0
.1
42
)
(0
.0
84
)
(0
.0
83
)
(0
.0
77
)
(0
.2
96
)
(0
.1
27
)
(0
.1
38
)
R
-s
qu
ar
ed
0.
08
5
0.
09
7
0.
04
0
0.
01
8
0.
00
8
0.
02
3
0.
13
2
0.
15
1
0.
04
0
O
bs
er
va
ti
on
s
36
61
43
79
43
79
43
79
43
79
43
79
43
79
43
79
43
79
E
ac
h
co
lu
m
n
co
rr
es
po
nd
s
to
a
di
ffe
re
nt
re
gr
es
si
on
,
fo
r
ea
ch
de
pe
nd
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
,
as
re
po
rt
ed
in
th
e
fir
st
lin
e.
R
ob
us
t
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
ad
ju
st
ed
fo
r
bl
oc
k
cl
us
te
ri
ng
ar
e
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s.
**
*
p<
0.
01
,*
*
p<
0.
05
,*
p<
0.
1
37
Table 8: Diversity and Public goods: Public safety in the neighborhood (To be continued)
Outcomes: Robberies Aggressions Burglary
(or attempt)
Ethnic Diversity 0.043 -0.024 -0.001
(0.039) (0.038) (0.027)
Household characteristics:
Gender -0.002 -0.012 -0.010
(0.010) (0.011) (0.007)
Age -0.000 -0.001* -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Level of Education 0.005** 0.006** -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Income (log) -0.004 -0.005 -0.004
(0.010) (0.010) (0.006)
Household size 0.010** 0.012** -0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Employment status (ref: Employed)
Unemployed 0.008 0.037** 0.009
(0.016) (0.017) (0.011)
Inactive -0.002 0.008 0.008
(0.014) (0.015) (0.010)
Nationality (ref: French at birth)
Naturalized French -0.007 -0.024 0.024
(0.019) (0.018) (0.017)
European -0.025 -0.018 0.025
(0.026) (0.024) (0.021)
Maghrebian -0.043** -0.034* 0.008
(0.019) (0.020) (0.015)
African -0.029 -0.056 0.037
(0.041) (0.037) (0.040)
Asian 0.005 0.016 -0.036**
(0.129) (0.113) (0.014)
Other nationality -0.075** -0.106*** -0.051**
(0.027) (0.031) (0.018)
Robust standard errors adjusted for block clustering are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 8: Diversity and Public goods: Public safety in the neighborhood (Continued)
Outcomes: Robberies Aggressions Burglary
(or attempt)
Building characteristics:
Nb of dwellings (log) -0.000 0.004 -0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Date of construction of the building (ref: before 1948)
1949 ≤ t < 1974 0.050** 0.034* 0.012
(0.019) (0.020) (0.015)
1975 ≤ t < 1981 0.071** 0.020 0.019
(0.022) (0.021) (0.015)
1982 ≤ t < 1989 0.071*** 0.047** 0.011
(0.021) (0.022) (0.015)
1990 ≤ t < 1998 0.071** 0.022 0.011
(0.022) (0.022) (0.015)
1999 ≤ t 0.027 -0.033 0.076
(0.052) (0.025) (0.064)
Neighborhood characteristics:
Block unempl. rate 0.019 0.200*** 0.042
(0.046) (0.051) (0.031)
Socio-economic Yes Yes Yes
background (Tabard)
Department Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects
Intercept 0.007 0.006 0.092
(0.097) (0.098) (0.069)
R-squared 0.020 0.024 0.002
Observations 4379 4379 4379
Each column corresponds to a different regression, for each dependent variable, as reported in the first line. Robust
standard errors adjusted for block clustering are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 9: Type of repairs done
Vandalism Poor Housing Quality Public Safety
Work in the commons: Major works: Security Equipment:
staircase, doors, façade, heating, entry code,
lights, glass elevator, toilets locks
(1) (2) (3)
Ethnic Diversity 0.134** -0.213*** 0.141***
(0.054) (0.069) (0.041)
R-squared 0.024 0.012 0.010
N 2220 2220 2220
Correlation (in %) with perception of degradations
1. Vandalism
Damaging the premises 5.79***
Graffiti 16.94***
Garbage on the floor 14.35***
Broken windows 11.86***
Broken doors 13.74***
Broken light bulbs 12.24***
Broken mailboxes 13.10***
Vandalism on the elevator 13.54*** 12.72***
2. Poor Housing Quality
Condition of the outside walls -3.46***
Cold in the apartment 3.89***
Cold due to bad insulation 1.29
Cold due to breakdown in heating equipment 4.70***
Cold due to poor equipment 0.012
Breakdown of the elevator -0.001
Toilet malfunction 4.31***
3. Public Safety
Robberies 2.52***
Aggressions 4.15***
Burglary (or attempt) 2.35***
Robust standard errors adjusted for block clustering are in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 10: Are results driven by some major ethnic groups disliking being around foreigners ? (to be
continued)
Dissatisfaction with Housing Conditions
(1) (2) (3)
Ethnic Diversity 0.368** 0.359** 0.313**
(0.129) (0.141) (0.154)
Household characteristics:
Gender -0.018 -0.018 -0.018
(0.032) (0.033) (0.032)
Age -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Education -0.013* -0.013* -0.012*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Income (log) -0.043 -0.045 -0.038
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
Household size 0.105*** 0.105*** 0.094***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.015)
Employment status(ref: Employed)
Unemployed 0.056 0.057 0.055
(0.055) (0.055) (0.055)
Inactive -0.049 -0.049 -0.051
(0.047) (0.047) (0.047)
Nationality (ref: French at birth)
Naturalized French -0.047 -0.030
(0.066) (0.144)
European 0.040 0.043
(0.089) (0.197)
Maghrebian -0.097 -0.095
(0.067) (0.186)
African 0.109 -0.239
(0.143) (0.324)
Asian -0.623** -0.150
(0.311) (0.814)
Other nationality 0.557 0.788
(0.633) (1.203)
Interaction terms: ELF * origin
ELF * naturalized French -0.052
(0.373)
ELF * European -0.007
(0.542)
ELF * Maghrebian -0.001
(0.401)
ELF * African 0.894
(0.751)
ELF * Asian -1.123
(1.340)
ELF * Other nationality -1.136
(4.552)
Each coefficient is estimated from a separate regression, according to equation 2. Robust standard errors
adjusted for block clustering are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 10: Continued
Dependent Variable: Dissatisfaction with housing condition
(1) (2) (3)
Major groups in HLM: Native French and Maghrebians
Native French household -0.043
(0.056)
ELF * Native French household 0.027
(0.169)
Maghrebian household 0.138
(0.259)
ELF * Maghrebian household -0.300
(0.559)
Building characteristics:
Nb of dwellings (log) 0.020 0.020 0.019
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Date of construction of the building (ref: before 1948)
1949 ≤ t < 1974 0.017 0.017 0.022
(0.077) (0.077) (0.077)
1975 ≤ t < 1981 -0.094 -0.094 -0.087
(0.081) (0.082) (0.082)
1982 ≤ t < 1989 -0.109 -0.109 -0.104
(0.082) (0.082) (0.082)
1990 ≤ t < 1998 -0.423*** -0.424*** -0.421***
(0.085) (0.086) (0.086)
1999 ≤ t -0.751*** -0.753*** -0.748***
(0.166) (0.166) (0.165)
Neighborhood characteristics:
Block unemployment rate 1.003*** 0.999*** 0.995***
(0.176) (0.176) (0.175)
Socio-economic Yes Yes Yes
background (Tabard)
Department Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects
Intercept 3.991*** 4.010*** 4.004***
(0.360) (0.363) (0.353)
R-squared 0.128 0.127 0.127
Observations 4379 4379 4379
Each coefficient is estimated from a separate regression, according to equation 2. Robust standard errors
adjusted for block clustering are in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 11: Variation in Perception of Housing quality: Within and Between Public Housing Blocks
Dissatisfaction with Housing conditions
Within correlation Between correlation
Gender 0.01 -0.03
(0.04) (0.04)
Age -0.00* -0.01***
(0.00) (0.00)
Education 0.01 -0.03***
(0.01) (0.01)
Income (log) -0.07* -0.09**
(0.04) (0.04)
Unemployed 0.05 0.08
(0.07) (0.06)
Inactive -0.08 0.02
(0.06) (0.06)
Household size 0.09*** 0.13***
(0.02) (0.01)
Naturalized French -0.11 -0.00
(0.08) (0.09)
European -0.00 0.19*
(0.11) (0.11)
Maghrebian -0.09 -0.01
(0.09) (0.08)
African -0.05 0.44**
(0.15) (0.20)
Asian -0.34 -0.56
(0.52) (0.53)
Other nationality -0.11 0.14
(0.79) (0.53)
Building size (log) 0.05***
(0.01)
Housing Project FE Yes No
R-squared 0.056 0.172
Observations 5105 5105
Robust standard errors adjusted for block clustering are in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 12: Ethnic Diversity and Distant public goods
Maintenance of Accessibility to Accessibility to
streets public transports private transports
Ethnic Diversity 0.158 -0.050 0.142
(0.096) (0.134) (0.102)
Gender 0.001 -0.036 0.015
(0.022) (0.028) (0.024)
Age -0.000 -0.002** -0.003**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Education -0.004 0.001 0.006
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Income (log) 0.013 0.010 0.038*
(0.024) (0.030) (0.023)
Unemployed 0.012 0.059 -0.027
(0.036) (0.041) (0.037)
Inactive 0.039 0.104** 0.008
(0.032) (0.039) (0.032)
Household size 0.018** 0.002 0.011
(0.008) (0.010) (0.009)
Naturalized French -0.096** -0.009 0.030
(0.045) (0.055) (0.048)
European 0.040 0.023 -0.099*
(0.070) (0.067) (0.060)
Maghrebian -0.057 -0.005 -0.069
(0.045) (0.051) (0.046)
African 0.037 0.119 -0.032
(0.095) (0.097) (0.101)
Asian -0.105 -0.128 0.176
(0.183) (0.282) (0.246)
Other nationality -0.330*** 0.112 -0.376***
(0.073) (0.343) (0.083)
Block unemployment rate 0.386*** -0.102 -0.041
(0.114) (0.144) (0.112)
Intercept 0.814** 4.365*** 0.783***
(0.276) (0.471) (0.233)
Department Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Socio economic backgrounds Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.053 0.283 0.101
N 4451 4451 4451
Robust
standard errors adjusted for block clustering are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 13: Ethnic Diversity and Dissatisfaction with Housing conditions – Robustness Checks (to be
continued)
Dissatisfaction with Housing Conditions
(1) (2) (3)
Ethnic Diversity 1.392**
(0.530)
Household characteristics:
Gender -0.018 -0.019 -0.021
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
Age -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Education -0.013* -0.014* -0.014*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Income (log) -0.041 -0.041 -0.040
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
Household size 0.105*** 0.104*** 0.105***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Employment status (ref: Employed)
Unemployed 0.050 0.059 0.051
(0.055) (0.055) (0.055)
Inactive -0.050 -0.049 -0.051
(0.047) (0.047) (0.047)
Nationality (ref: French at birth)
Naturalized French -0.044 -0.043 -0.036
(0.066) (0.066) (0.066)
European 0.059 0.058 0.062
(0.088) (0.089) (0.089)
Maghrebian -0.107 -0.106 -0.108
(0.068) (0.068) (0.068)
African 0.092 0.098 0.097
(0.143) (0.143) (0.143)
Asian -0.615* -0.607* -0.605*
(0.316) (0.318) (0.315)
Other nationality 0.577 0.565 0.569
(0.630) (0.632) (0.634)
Building characteristics:
Nb of dwellings (log) 0.017 0.020 0.019
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Date of construction of the building (ref: before 1948)
1949 ≤ t < 1974 0.007 0.022 0.012
(0.077) (0.077) (0.076)
1975 ≤ t < 1981 -0.115 -0.101 -0.110
(0.082) (0.081) (0.081)
1982 ≤ t < 1989 -0.134 -0.122 -0.129
(0.082) (0.082) (0.082)
1990 ≤ t < 1998 -0.444*** -0.438*** -0.439***
(0.085) (0.086) (0.085)
1999 ≤ t -0.769*** -0.770*** -0.751***
(0.168) (0.168) (0.170)
Robust standard errors adjusted for block clustering are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 13: Continued
Dependent Variable: Dissatisfaction with housing condition
(1) (2) (3)
Neighborhood characteristics:
Block unemployment rate 0.909*** 0.954*** 0.911***
(0.175) (0.175) (0.174)
Socio-economic Yes Yes Yes
background (Tabard)
Department Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects
Ethnic group shares:
% European -3.249** -0.928* -2.273**
(1.007) (0.493) (0.961)
% Maghrebian -1.092 0.633** 2.014***
(0.707) (0.277) (0.521)
% African -1.203 0.941 1.218
(1.101) (0.823) (1.428)
% Asian -2.186* 0.167 0.315
(1.323) (0.974) (1.838)
% Other nationality -1.488* 0.260 -0.263
(0.855) (0.501) (0.864)
Squared ethnic group shares:
(% European)2 7.587*
(4.332)
(% Maghrebian)2 -3.767**
(1.220)
(% African)2 -4.225
(7.839)
(% Asian)2 -4.792
(14.523)
(% Other nationality)2 1.351
(2.895)
Intercept 4.009*** 4.071*** 4.023***
(0.361) (0.362) (0.363)
R-squared 0.131 0.129 0.131
Observations 4379 4379 4379
Robust standard errors adjusted for block clustering are in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
46
Table 14: A proxy for language fractionalization
Dependent Dissatisfaction with Neglect of Quality of Insecurity
Variable: housing conditions the commons housing
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A:
Diversity based on 0.368*** 1.532*** 0.727*** 0.0252
nationality at birth (0.129) (0.422) (0.263) (0.183)
Observations 4,379 1,693 3,797 4,379
R-squared 0.156 0.201 0.192 0.063
Panel B:
Diversity based on
share of the population 0.366*** 1.560*** 0.741** -0.0377
speaking French in (0.141) (0.472) (0.290) (0.199)
country of origin
Observations 4,365 1,689 3,788 4,365
R-squared 0.157 0.202 0.193 0.064
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Controls: head of household characteris-
tics (gender, age, education, activity status, aggregated nationality), household characteristics (log of in-
come, household size), building characteristics (date of construction, log number of housing units), socio-
economic background of the neighborhood (unemployment rate, Nicole Tabbard classification), department
fixed-effects. Each coefficient comes from a separate regression. The columns indicate the four dependent
variables under study. Panel A and panel B respectively correspond to the measure of diversity used in each
regression.
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Table 15: Correlation between new inhabitants’ nationality and share of the area population of the
same nationality
Dep Var: Share of population of the same ethnic group as new movers in a given area
(1) (2)
Share of the department population of the the same ethnic group 0.890***
(0.034)
Nationality (reference group: Other nationalities)
Native 0.816*** 0.067**
(0.010) (0.030)
Naturalized French -0.044*** -0.037**
(0.012) (0.012)
European -0.022* -0.007
(0.012) (0.011)
Maghrebian 0.001 0.007
(0.014) (0.013)
African -0.025 -0.016
(0.015) (0.015)
Asian -0.085* -0.019
(0.049) (0.047)
Public Housing (HLM) -0.158** -0.184**
(0.068) (0.066)
Nationality * HLM
HLM * Native -0.038 0.040
(0.034) (0.033)
HLM * Naturalized 0.095** 0.051
(0.037) (0.036)
HLM * European -0.018 0.010
(0.038) (0.037)
HLM * Maghrebian 0.055 0.024
(0.037) (0.036)
HLM * African 0.046 0.017
(0.040) (0.039)
HLM * Asian 0.083 0.027
(0.080) (0.078)
Household characteristics
Age 0.002** 0.002**
(0.001) (0.001)
Age squared -0.000** -0.000**
(0.000) (0.000)
Hourly wage (log) -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
Education Yes Yes
HLM * Education Yes Yes
Socio-Econ Category Yes Yes
HLM * SEC Yes Yes
Department Fixed Effect Yes Yes
Intercept 0.085** 0.070**
(0.036) (0.035)
R-squared 0.856 0.864
N 11519 11519
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001 48
Table 16: Rejection of HLM offers and Ethnic diversity
Coefficient associated with Ethnic Diversity
Rows: Dependent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Sample of households who currently live in public housing:
I. Probability of having declined 0.058 0.069 0.017 0.123
at least one HLM offer during the (0.058) (0.063) (0.067) (0.0886)
previous application process
N 1,779 1,779 1,748 1,744
R² 0.001 0.021 0.023 0.089
II. Probability that the reason for having 0.162 0.061 0.017 -0.0310
declined an HLM offer during the previous (0.144) (0.158) (0.171) (0.258)
application was "unpleasant environment"
N 417 417 415 414
R² 0.003 0.035 0.050 0.308
Panel B: Sample of households who are currently applying to public housing:
I. Probability of having declined -0.063 -0.043 -0.088 -0.116
at least one HLM offer during the (0.057) (0.064) (0.071) (0.103)
current application process
N 1,192 1,192 1,173 1,171
R² 0.001 0.014 0.024 0.121
II. Probability that the reason for having 0.004 -0.007 -0.104 -0.122
declined an HLM offer during the current (0.194) (0.237) (0.250) (0.506)
application was "unpleasant environment"
N 198 198 195 194
R² 0.000 0.083 0.115 0.590
Each of the coefficients is estimated from a separate regression of each of the four dependent variables de-
scribed in the first column on ethnic diversity. Column 1 does not include any control. Column 2 includes
households characteristics (gender, age, education, employment status and nationality of the head of house-
hold, total income (in log) of the household per unit of consumption, and household size). Column 3 adds
up the characteristics of the building (number of apartments (in log) and construction date). On top of
that, column 4 includes neighborhood characteristics (socio-economic background (Tabard index), and local
unemployment rate), as well as department fixed effects. In addition, a dummy variable indicating whether
the household already lives in the public housing sector is included in specifications 2 to 4 of Panel B. The
coefficients for all the controls are available from authors upon request. Robust standard errors adjusted for
block clustering are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 17: Do households having left their previous housing due to an “unpleasant environment” now
live in less diverse neighborhoods?
Dependent Variable: Main reason for leaving previous housing:
unpleasant environment (noise, lifestyle or insecurity)
Households who moved within the Households who moved toward the
Private Public Private Public
Housing sector Housing sector Housing sector Housing sector
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ethnic Diversity -0.073** 0.083 -0.061* 0.016
(0.030) (0.140) (0.032) (0.052)
Observations 5,955 627 6,560 1,793
R-squared 0.030 0.207 0.031 0.079
In each regression, we control for household characteristics (gender, age, education, income (in log), employ-
ment status, nationality, household size), building characteristics (number of apartments and construction
date), neighborhood characteristics (socio-economic background (Tabard index), and local unemployment
rate) and department fixed effects. The coefficients for all the controls are available from authors upon
request.
Robust standard errors adjusted for block clustering are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Appendix
A. Fractionalization index and French blocks
Table 18: Housing blocks in the Census 1999
Number of blocks sampled per department Number of individuals sampled per block
All France HLM Population All France HLM Population
Mean 2,894.5 932.9 24.6 18.4
Median 2,236 740.5 15 8
Table 19: Fractionalization by nationality at birth in housing blocks
1999 Census 2002 Housing Survey
Whole France Private Housing HLM Population Whole France HLM Population
Mean 16.65 14.29 27.68 16.23 25.33
Median 11.82 10.29 25.18 11.98 23.37
Std Dev 15.33 13.36 18.75 14.2 17.94
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0
Maximum 91.83 91.83 91.3 84.94 80.26
N 6,643,287 5,027,235 1,616,052 28,744 4,465
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Figure 1: Fractionalization by nationality at birth within private and public housing blocks, Census
1999
B. Principal component analysis
To decompose the various effects of fractionalization, we alternatively run an exploratory analysis
to extract the main dimensions with which the various questions reported in the HS correlate the
most. We then interpret those factors as different dimensions of the quality of public spaces that
could be affected by ethnic diversity. The principal component analysis lets the correlation patterns
among the various questions emerge endogenously from the data, rather than grouping them in an
arbitrary way. We select (following the Kaiser criterion) three main factors with eigenvalues higher
than one that emerged from the principal component analysis of the relevant survey questions. Table
20 reports those three factors and the rotated matrix of correlations between those factors and each
question. Three main patterns of correlation emerge that refer broadly speaking to three dimensions
of the quality of the public space. Table 5 reports descriptive statistics of the various questions.
For each variable, a lower value represents a better outcome (e.g. greater care of the commons, less
graffiti, better soundproofing...).
We then create summary indices from the three groups of questions identified in the previous
section. We run a principal component analysis on each group of questions, and take the first
principal component of each. We refer to those indices as "Neglect of the public areas", "Quality of
housing" and "Public Safety". The higher the indices, the more unfavorable are the outcomes. We
also check the robustness of the results by looking at alternative summary indices, taking the sum
of the questions belonging to each group, or performing a mean effect analysis for each group. The
estimates for these alternative indices are reported in Appendix C, yielding similar results.
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Table 20: Principal component analysis
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
Care of the commons 0.142 0.225 0.053
Voluntary degradations of the commons 0.675 0.172 0.091
Graffiti on the walls 0.209 -0.126 0.023
Trash in the commons 0.247 0.047 0.085
Broken doors in the commons 0.591 0.166 0.123
Broken lights in the commons 0.564 0.072 0.031
Degradation of mail boxes 0.528 0.130 0.034
Broken elevators 0.528 -0.031 -0.041
Quality of the building’s façade -0.038 0.239 -0.030
Problem with heating in the building -0.007 0.336 0.029
Quality of soundproofing 0.042 0.703 0.004
Noise disturbance during the day in the housing 0.060 0.831 0.052
Noise disturbance at night in the housing 0.113 0.807 0.105
Victim or witness of aggression in the neighborhood 0.098 0.136 0.746
Victim or witness of robbery in the neighborhood -0.006 0.028 0.810
Table 21 shows the effect of ethnic fractionalization on those three different dimensions: "Neglect
of the public areas", "Quality of housing" and "Public Safety".44 For each index, we run separate
regressions on ethnic diversity controlling for the usual household, building and neighborhood char-
acteristics as specified at the bottom of each column in Table 21.
As can be surmised from an examination of three sets of regressions on Table 21, the results
relying on categories derived from the principal component analysis rather than the categories that
followed from the theoretical literature on public goods, and relying on identical model specifications,
are basically similar. For the effect of ethnic diversity on the synthetic index Neglect of Public Areas
(see the first panel of Table 21), the effect of ethnic diversity is always statistically significant at the
1 percent level, and is substantively sizeable. For the index of Poor Housing Quality, the coefficient
associated with ethnic diversity is statistically significant at the 1 percent level for the first two
specifications but only at the 5 percent level when all the controls are included. However, as with
the results using the theoretically inferred categorization in the main body of the paper, its effect
is much lower than for the index for voluntary degradations. For the index of Public Safety, the
data here show that ethnic diversity does not have a statistically significant effect on public safety
in the public housing sector in our full specification, as is the case in our main results. In sum,
categorization by principal components analysis yields quite similar results as to those reported
with the theoretically derived categorization.
44The coefficient estimates for the control variables are not reported here but are very similar to those reported in
Table 4. The full regression results are available upon request.
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Table 21: Ethnic Diversity and Public Goods (public housing)
Ethnic Diversity
(1) (2) (3)
Index for Neglect of Public Areas
1.791*** 1.514*** 1.532***
(0.322) (0.330) (0.422)
Observations 1,700 1,693 1,693
R-squared 0.060 0.084 0.134
Index for Poor Quality of Housing
2.132*** 1.382*** 0.727**
(0.187) (0.200) (0.263)
Observations 3,869 3,805 3,797
R-squared 0.092 0.128 0,161
Index for Public Safety
0.330** 0.273* 0.025
(0.129) (0.139) (0.183)
Observations 4,464 4,388 4,379
R-squared 0.014 0.014 0.033
Household characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Building characteristics No Yes Yes
Neighborhood characteristics No No Yes
Department fixed effects No No Yes
Each coefficient is estimated from a separate regression, according to equation 2. The four dependent variables
considered include the answer to the general opinion / dissatisfaction question and the three indices that
were derived from principal component analysis as described in section 4.2. Each index is regressed on
either ethnic diversity, controlling for the usual household and neighborhood characteristics unless otherwise
indicated. Robust standard errors adjusted for block clustering are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1
C. Alternative summary indices - Mean effect analysis
As a robustness check, we have also experimented with alternative indexes for measuring these three
dimensions of housing conditions. We have first looked at basic indices defined as the sum of the
outcome variables related to each dimension. For each of the three dimensions considered, we thus
obtain a variable which increases with the number of adverse outcomes one faces. Table 22 reports
the results of the regression of these three indices on ethnic diversity for our favorite specification.
Our results are robust to these alternative indices: the effect of ethnic diversity is still strongly
significant for the index of Housing Quality, and is even stronger for the index for Neglect of Public
Areas. As noted previously, there is no effect of diversity on public safety.
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Table 22: Diversity and Public goods: sum of the various outcomes, Public Housing
Ethnic Diversity
(1)
1. Neglect of the Public Areas
Sum of the outcome variables 2.321***
(0.575)
2. Quality of Housing
Sum of the outcome variables 1.511***
(0.360)
3. Public Safety
Sum of the outcome variables 0.029
(0.059)
Socio-economic
Background of area Yes***
Department fixed effects Yes***
Each coefficient is estimated from a separate regression, according to equation 2. The three dependent
variables considered are the three indices reported in bold. Each index is regressed on either ethnic diversity,
controlling for the usual household and neighborhood characteristics unless otherwise indicated. Robust
standard errors adjusted for block clustering are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
To be more thorough, we next perform a mean effect analysis. Following Kling, Liebman and
Katz (2007), we construct summary indices aggregating information across the various related out-
comes for each of the three dimensions studied above. To build the three summary indices, we
first normalize each outcome using a pseudo-control group defined by individuals living in blocks
characterized by a below-median fractionalization index, as in Glennerster, Miguel and Rothenberg
(2010). Let Yk be the kth of K related outcomes. Each standardized outcome Y ∗k is obtained by
subtracting the mean µk and dividing by the standard deviation σk of the outcome variable among
the low diversity pseudo-control group: Y ∗k = (Yk − µk)/σk. We then average the related standard-
ized outcomes to form the summary index : Y ∗ =
∑
k Y
∗
k /K. Accordingly, our summary index for
neglect of the commons averages nine standardized measures including graffiti, broken mailboxes,
broken elevator, low care of the commons, voluntary degradations and garbage on the floor; the
index for poor housing conditions averages five standardized measures of quality of apartment’s
soundproofing, of efficiency of the heating system, and of the general state of the outside walls; and
finally the public safety indicator averages standardized measures of robbery and personal aggression.
Table 23 presents the raw and normalized components of the three broad summary indices. The
first column displays the mean of each outcome among the low-diversity group. The normalized
outcomes for this pseudo-control group are displayed in column 2, with mean equal to zero by con-
struction. Column 3 reports the difference between the mean of each outcome among the households
living in high diversity neighborhoods (a treated group of sorts) and that of the low diversity pop-
ulation. All but one of the differences are positive indicating that the average outcome is generally
worse in more heterogeneous areas. Column 4 shows the difference between the normalized outcomes
for treatment and control group, and allows for a more comprehensive reading. For instance, we
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know from column 3 that the raw difference between care of the commons in low and high diversity
areas is of 0.14. Column 4 now tells us that this difference is of 0.19 standard deviations, relative to
the control group standard deviation.
Table 24 reports mean effect estimates from regressing the summary indices for negligence,
quality of housing and public safety on ethnic diversity and other variables, as in specification 2.
The coefficient on ethnic diversity is the mean effect size. As expected, for the negligence index and
the quality of housing index, mean effect estimates of ethnic diversity are strongly positive (column
1). Using summary indices also allows us to compare the mean effect of diversity on those two
normalized outcomes: lines 1 and 2 of Table 24 tell us that ethnic diversity has a more adverse
impact on the neglect of common areas than on the average quality of housing. This gives us an
insight concerning the mechanisms at play: high levels of ethnic diversity are more likely to generate
uncivic behaviors that could be avoided by higher quality social norms. By contrast, the mean effect
estimate in the third line indicates that ethnic diversity plays no role on public safety.
Table 23: Components of Summary Indices,Public Housing
Low ELF High ELF
- low ELF
Raw Norm Raw Norm
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1. Neglect of the Public Areas
Care of the commons 1.49 0 0.14 0.19
Damaging in the premises 1.45 0 0.25 0.36
Graffiti 0.63 0 0.03 0.07
Garbage on the floor 0.42 0 0.08 0.16
Broken glass 0.31 0 0.06 0.13
Broken doors 0.32 0 0.01 0.01
Broken light bulbs 0.18 0 0.07 0.18
Broken mailboxes 0.33 0 0.09 0.19
Broken elevators 0.14 0 0.1 0.28
2. Quality of Housing
Condition of the outside walls 2.42 0 0.01 0.01
Quality of soundproofing 1.83 0 0.23 0.28
Noisy in daytime 1.48 0 0.16 0.22
Noisy in night time 1.27 0 0.15 0.27
Cold in the apartment 0.14 0 0.08 0.23
3. Public Safety
Robberies 0.08 0 0.01 0.05
Aggressions 0.06 0 0.02 0.08
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Table 24: Diversity and Public goods: mean effect estimates, Public Housing
Ethnic Diversity
(1)
1. Neglect of the Public Areas
Mean effect estimate 0.545***
(0.130)
2. Quality of Housing
Mean effect estimate 0.467***
(0.107)
3. Public Safety
Mean effect estimate 0.050
(0.112)
Socio-economic
Background of area Yes***
Department fixed effects Yes***
Each coefficient is estimated from a separate regression, according to equation 2. The three dependent
variables considered are the three summary indices indices reported in bold. Each index is regressed on
either ethnic diversity, controlling for the usual household and neighborhood characteristics unless otherwise
indicated. Robust standard errors adjusted for block clustering are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1
The broad picture drawn in the three previous sets of regressions is largely confirmed by the
regressions of each separate normalized outcome. The corresponding mean effect estimates of ethnic
diversity are presented in table 25. Although diversity has no significant impact on a few outcomes,
such as broken glass or broken light bulbs in the commons, we still have a very strong negative
effect of diversity on every other negligence or housing quality outcome in the public sector. As
noted earlier, the mean effects estimates for negligence outcomes are on average larger than those
for housing quality. The effect measured on broken light bulbs is the strongest, with a more than
one standard deviation difference between low and high diversity neighborhoods, while the lowest
is obtained for the quality of sound proofing, with a difference of about one third in terms of its
standard deviation. Turning to public safety, the mean effect estimates on robberies and direct
aggressions are both insignificant in the public housing sector in our favorite specification.
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Table 25: Ethnic diversity and disaggregated housing outcomes : mean effects analysis, Public
Housing
Ethnic diversity
(1) (2)
1. Neglect of the Public Areas
Care of the commons 0.752*** 0.549***
(0.124) (0.164)
Damaging the premises 1.271*** 1.019***
(0.140) (0.183)
Graffiti 0.387** 0.488**
(0.151) (0.216)
Garbage on the floor 0.668*** 0.625***
(0.162) (0.227)
Broken glass 0.475*** 0.368
(0.182) (0.238)
Broken doors 0.228 0.110
(0.176) (0.241)
Broken light bulbs 0.878*** 1.049***
(0.187) (0.248)
Broken mailboxes 0.652*** 0.927***
(0.176) (0.239)
Broken elevators 0.694*** 0.656**
(0.227) (0.288)
2. Quality of Housing
Condition of the outside walls 0.629*** 0.414***
(0.109) (0.151)
Quality of soundproofing 0.963*** 0.393***
(0.099) (0.138)
Noisy in daytime 0.935*** 0.613***
(0.110) (0.148)
Noisy in night time 1.096*** 0.676***
(0.121) (0.159)
Cold in the apartment 0.634*** 0.418**
(0.128) (0.184)
3. Public Safety
Robberies 0.207** 0.149
(0.103) (0.140)
Aggressions 0.231** -0.0489
(0.104) (0.149)
Socio eco. background
and department. fixed effects No Yes
Each entry is the coefficient estimate on ethnic diversity from a separate regression.
All the regressions include controls for household characteristics.
Robust standard errors adjusted for block clustering are in parentheses. The components of the three summary
indices are the variables listed below each of them. Descriptive statistics for these outcomes are in Table 5.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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